Well, that is true anywhere.
But, I also called attention to why it is important to focus on Pakistan:
But what else we are seeing is the Pakistani Deep State, which is involved in nuclear proliferation for profit, heroin smuggling, and other lucrative activities, as well as support for Islamic terrorism, battling other factions of Pakistan's elite.
I finished that post with this:
The War on Terror will be decided mainly in Pakistan.
A major battle in the War on Drugs will also be decided there, as, until the War on Terror in Afghanistan is ended, the instability there will foment trafficking of high-quality heroin as Afghanistan essentially corners the world market for both quality and quantity.
And, there is profiteering and the Great Game going on.
All of this fuels corruption in Rawalpindi and Islamabad and, of course, in London and especially in Washington.
There is a covert fight occuring to decide Pakistan's future, and even Pakistan's existence as a sovereign nation.
We now examine that covert fight.
First, we define a few terms. Overt action refers to when everyone knows something is happening, and everyone knows who is doing it. Covert action is when everyone knows something is happening, but no one really knows who is behind it. Then, there is clandestine action: people don't even know that something is going on.
The fight in Pakistan is covert - you can read the paper, watch TV and surf the 'net and know something is going on, but we do not really know who is behind it or what their agenda is.
David Coleman Headley was indicted, charged with twelve counts of being on the wrong side in the War on Terror. Legal proceedings are ongoing, and from an article entitled Implicating ISI in terror, Headley says hatred of India after 1971 war drove him to LeT by Shalini Parekh & Chidanand Rajghatta, May 24, 2011, we learn the following:
CHICAGO/WASHINGTON: Hatred of India arising from Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war drove him to the terror outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba, David Coleman Headley, the Pakistani expatriate who involved in the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack told a Chicago court on Monday while implicating Pakistan's spy agency ISI in nurturing terrorism.
First, a little bit about Lashkar-e-Taiba. From Bad Company: Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and the Growing Ambition of Islamist Militancy in Pakistan, testimony before Congress by Lisa Curtis, dated March 11, 2010:
My name is Lisa Curtis. I am a senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.
The Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, a Pakistan-based terrorist organization, poses a threat to U.S. citizens as well as to critical U.S. national security interests, including promoting stability in South Asia and degrading the overall threat from terrorism emanating from the region. The U.S. government has previously associated the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT — "Army of the Pure") primarily with the Indo–Pakistani dispute over Kashmir and has viewed the group as less inimical to U.S. interests than al-Qaeda, although the U.S. State Department has listed the LeT as a Foreign Terrorist Organization since December, 2001.
Notice that Lashkar-e-Taiba, by whatever spelling, means "Army of the Pure".
This series is entitled Campaign for the Land of the Pure, and a previous series (see sidebar) was entitled The Land of the Pure.
Where do these names come from?
This trial addresses connections to the Mumbai terrorist attack, and is bringing up connections between LeT and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, or ISI.
For more background, we consider an excerpt from The Threat to the US Homeland Emanating from Pakistan, Congressional testimony by Stephen Tankel with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, dated May 3, 2011:
Lashkar-e-Taiba (the Army of the Pure or LeT) is one of Pakistan's oldest and most powerful militant groups. India has been its primary enemy since the early 1990s and the group has never considered itself to be an al-Qaeda affiliate, but LeT did begin contributing to al-Qaeda's global jihad against the United States and its allies after 9/11. The spectacular nature of the 2008 Mumbai attacks and target selection suggested LeT continued to prioritize jihad against India, but was moving deeper into al-Qaeda's orbit. Despite repeated calls by a chorus of U.S. officials on Pakistan to take actions against the group in the wake of Mumbai, LeT's position remains relatively secure. There are several reasons. First, Pakistan is facing a serious insurgency and LeT remains one of the few militant outfits whose policy is to refrain from launching attacks against the state. The security establishment has taken a triage approach, determining that to avoid additional instability it must not take any action that could draw LeT further into the insurgency. Second, the Pakistan army and its powerful Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) have long considered LeT to be the country's most reliable proxy against India and the group still provides utility in this regard. LeT also provides potential leverage at the negotiating table and so it is therefore unrealistic to assume support for the group will cease without a political payoff from India in return. As a result, the consensus among the Pakistani security establishment appears to be that, at least in the short-term, taking steps to dismantle the group would chiefly benefit India, while Pakistan would be left to deal with the costs. Finally, LeT provides social services and relief aid via its above ground wing, Jamaat-ul-Dawa, and its activities in this sphere have led to a well of support among segments of the populace.
To understand LeT and how it grew so powerful, one must recognize the two dualities that define it. The first is that it is a missionary and a militant organization that for most of its history has placed an equivalent emphasis on reshaping society at home (through preaching and social welfare) and to waging violent jihad abroad. The second is that its military activities are informed both by its pan-Islamist rationale for jihad and its role as a proxy for the Pakistani state. LeT was able to grow into a powerful and protected organization in Pakistan as a result of its ability to reconcile these dualities. Jihad against India to liberate Muslim land under perceived Hindu occupation aligned with LeT's ideological priorities and also with state interests. This enabled the group to become Pakistan's most reliable proxy, which brought with it substantial benefits including the support needed to construct a robust social welfare apparatus used for missionary and reformist purposes. However, this approach also necessitated trade-offs and compromises after 9/11, since preserving its position vis-à-vis the state sometimes forced the group to sublimate its pan-Islamist impulses. As the decade wore on, internal tensions increased over who LeT should be fighting against.
Finally, for some additional background, we review Lashkar-e-Toiba 'Army of the Pure', excerpts of which are quite eye-opening:
The LeT has consistently advocated the use of force and vowed that it would plant the 'flag of Islam' in Washington, Tel Aviv and New Delhi.
Arrests made during March-April 2004 near Baghdad brought to light links between the LeT and Islamist groups fighting the United States military in Iraq.
LeT has an extensive network that run across Pakistan and India with branches in Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom, Bangladesh and South East Asia.
The outfit collects donations from the Pakistani community in the Persian Gulf and United Kingdom, Islamic Non-Governmental Organisations, and Pakistani and Kashmiri businessmen. It receives considerable financial, material and other forms of assistance from the Pakistan government, routed primarily through the ISI. The ISI is the main source of LeT's funding. Saudi Arabia also provides funds.
The LeT maintains ties to various religious/military groups around the world, ranging from the Philippines to the Middle East and Chechnya primarily through the al Qaeda fraternal network.
The LeT has also been part of the Bosnian campaign against the Serbs.
It has allegedly set up sleeper cells in the U.S. and Australia, trained terrorists from other countries and has entered new theatres of Jihad like Iraq.
The group has links with many international Islamist terrorist groups like the Ikhwan-ul-Musalmeen of Egypt and other Arab groups.
LeT has a unit in Germany and also receives help from the Al Muhajiraun, supporter of Sharia Group, (Abu Hamza Masari- of Mosque Finsbury Park, North London) and its annual convention is regularly attended by fraternal bodies in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Bahrain, Oman, Kosovo, Bangladesh, Myanmar, USA, Palestine, Bosnia, Philippines, Jordan, Chechnya, etc.
The outfit collects donations from the Pakistani community in the Persian Gulf and United Kingdom, Islamic Non-Governmental Organisations, and Pakistani and Kashmiri businessmen. It receives considerable financial, material and other forms of assistance from the Pakistan government, routed primarily through the ISI. The ISI is the main source of LeT's funding. Funds also come from some sources in Saudi Arabia.
We now skip down in indicted, charged with twelve counts of being on the wrong side in the War on Terror. Legal proceedings are ongoing, and from Implicating ISI in terror, Headley says hatred of India after 1971 war drove him to LeT, where Headley is discussing LeT:
He chronologically mentioned his handlers in LET, including the others charged along with Rana, in a recent second superceding indictment, including Pasha, Kashmiri, Saajid and Major Iqbal. He also related various types of camps he attended in different regions of Pakistan, ranging from essential espionage, to arms training, surveillance training and hand to hand combat.
"These groups operate under the umbrella of the ISI... They coordinate with each other," Headley told the court, recalling that one time, when he suggested that LeT sue the U.S government for designating it as a terrorist organization, LeT leader Zaki-ur Rehman said "he would have to consult the ISI."
Headley also related how his LeT handler Ali took his phone number and told him that a "Major Iqbal" would be calling him about an operation in India. The prosecution case mentions a "Major Iqbal," believed to be a serving ISI officer, who is alleged to have coordinated the Mumbai attacks.
Allegations surfacing in credible expert testimony before Congress, and elsewhere in a criminal trial, that Pakistan's ISI is pulling the strings on the terrorist organization behind the Mumbai attacks, the LeT (the "Army of the Pure"), and discussions of one "Major Iqbal" - a name growing in importance.
Then there are claims by the LeT that they will plant the flag of Islam in Washington, D.C., as well as credible reports that they are connected to terrorist organizations all over the world, including having sleeper cells right here in the United States.
Do you think the "Campaign for the Land of the Pure" is only a fight for control of Pakistan?