Qatar Minimizes Impact of US Economic Sanctions on Sudan

In Victory is Ours, Part 3 we looked at the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, considering how, to a certain extent, the conflict was becoming a proxy war between Iran, supporting Khartoum in the North, and Israel, supporting Juba in the South. We also considered the possibility that the Iran/Israel proxy fight could itself be, to some small extent, a proxy fight between China and the US.

In this post, we will consider support that Bashir's government in Khartoum is receiving from Qatar.

First, we consider excerpts of an article that appeared in Sudan Now Magazine, issued by the Sudan News Agency, entitled A report: Sudan and Qatar bonds of strong relations, by Amal Mohamed Al Hassan, dated August 30, 2010. It is worth keeping in mind that the author's command of English shows a few peculiarities; for example, towards the end of the article, he writes "militants" when he clearly has in mind military personnel and officials with a military background. The article begins by providing a brief history of Sudan-Qatar relations, including major state visits, then goes into the impact of these relations.

The Sudanese – Qatari relations are characterized by depth and firmness as the leadership in the two countries are linked to each other with deeply rooted ties that appeared clearly in the exchanged political support at all the regional and international forums, and the coordination in the stances on the issues of mutual concern to the two countries.

The State of Qatar provided a considerable support to Sudan, especially with regard to issues pending before the Security Council when it assumed the world body non-permanent seat in early 2006. Qatar also extended material supports to Sudan in various fields, such as the implementation of Merowe Dam and the institute for qualification of Islamic preachers _etc.

The joint Sudanese – Qatari ministerial committee was established in Doha on March 16, 1998 and held three sessions which witnessed the signing of a number of agreements, memos of understanding and adopted a number of joint action plans in different fields, top of them were the agreements on avoiding double-taxation, encouragement of investment, education, scientific research, health, air transport as well as the cooperation in the youth, cultural, arts and media spheres.

The article then proceeds to address some of the economics of the situation and its impact, especially concerning large numbers of Sudanese who emigrated to Qatar to work in the petroleum industry. Then, the emigration of officials from Sudan's state security apparatus is introduced:

Qatar decided to seek the experience of Sudanese nationals, thus it brought consultants and experts to help establishing its ministries and important organs. At that time, Sudan managed to dispatch numbers of senior Armed Forces and Police officers, like Field Marshal Abdul-Rahman Suwaral-Dahab, the senior diplomat Mahjoub Makkawi, Al-Fatih Awooda from the Ministry of Justice and other experts from different institutions. These personalities played a great role and in an excellent manner and were appreciated by the Qatari people due to their distinguished efforts, performance, competence, skills, honesty and good deeds.

The article then gives statistics regarding the numbers of Sudanese working in Qatar, and what fields they work in:

The first Sudanese community in Qatar was formed in the year 1985. The statistics of the Qatari Ministry of Interior revealed that the number of the Sudanese nationals in Qatar reached 31,000 persons. The Sudanese community in Qatar includes labors, which is the biggest category; most of them are camel herders at Al-Shahaniya area, employees, militants, engineers, doctors, pharmacists, veterinary doctors, agronomists, lawyers, economists, media men, university lecturers. There are a considerable number of Sudanese nationals assuming leading positions at the areas of their work. Members of the Sudanese community are linked to each others with professional and geographical links.

With that background established, we look more recent and specific developments between the two nations. From Sudan, Qatar sign six co-op agreements, December 5, 2011:

KHARTOUM - Sudan and Qatar have signed six cooperation agreements and memorandum at the conclusion of the Sudanese-Qatari Economic Forum, Khartoum's Al Ray Al A'm daily reported Monday.

The agreements included the establishment of the joint Sudanese- Qatari Business Council, a memorandum of understanding in the field of mining between the Sudanese Ministry of Minerals and Qatar Mining Company, a banking cooperation agreement, an agreement between the Sudanese Ministry of Agriculture and Hasad Company of Qatar, a cooperation agreement between Ajial Medical Company of Sudan and Qatari Company for Medical solutions, and a memorandum of understanding between the Sudanese committee entrusted with public utilities and Hasad Agricultural Company of Qatar.

After addressing other details and areas for further cooperation, the article concludes:

The Qatari Crown Prince Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani visited Khartoum on Sunday where he participated in the Sudanese-Qatari economic forum and inaugurated a number of Qatari projects in Sudan.

According to official Sudanese statistics, the approved Qatari investments in Sudan amounted to 23 projects in different sectors, totaling $1.7 billion.

Sudan is the target of ongoing US economic sanctions, which appear to having an impact from the US perspective. From GAO-10-742 "SUDAN DIVESTMENT: U.S. Investors Sold Assets but Could Benefit from Increased Disclosure Regarding Companies' Ties to Sudan", dated June, 2010:

U.S. state fund managers reported that, since 2006, they have divested or frozen¹⁶ about $3.5 billion in assets primarily related to Sudan in response to their state laws and policies; U.S. investment companies, which also sold Sudan-related assets, most commonly cited normal business reasons for changes in their holdings. We found that, from 2006 to 2010, 23 states divested their assets from a total of 67 operating companies, with New Jersey’s divestment of almost $2.2 billion representing about 62 percent of the total.

[snip]

Specifically, we determined that, from March 2007 to December 2009, the total value of U.S. shares invested in six key foreign companies with Sudan-related business operations declined by almost 60 percent. This decline cannot be accounted for solely by a reduction in stock prices for these companies, indicating that U.S. investors, on net, decided to sell shares in these companies.

With about $3.5 billion in US investments gone from Sudan, Qatar has been stepping up to the plate to help Khartoum. From Qatar loans Sudan $2 billion amid slipping currency, February 6, 2012:

February 6, 2012 (KHARTOUM) – The government of Qatar is set to loan Sudan USD $2 billion as the country enters a phase of deep economic crisis that was compounded by the secession of the oil rich South less than a year ago.

According to local media in Khartoum, the Emir of Qatar Hamad Bin Khalifa al-Thani will arrive in the country on Wednesday to witness the inauguration of the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA).

[snip]

Last Friday, the Sudanese president said that his government is expecting help from friendly nations at a time when the Sudanese pound reached record lows against other major currencies.

As the government lost access to 75% of oil reserves in the south, the influx of hard currency has been severely curtailed forcing the Central Bank to be extra prudent with its available foreign exchange reserves.

For more than a year Khartoum has imposed a wide range of restrictions on individuals and corporations in relation to purchasing and transferring hard currency. Many imports were placed on a black list to cut outflow of forex.

Black market traders told Reuters that the Sudanese pound on Monday hit its lowest point against the dollar since the currency was launched in 2007.

A dollar bought 5.2 Sudanese pounds on Monday, compared to 3.3 in July, dealers said. The official rate is around 3.

Demand for the dollar, and controls on the official exchange rate, have turned the black market rate into a benchmark. Even large companies have started trading money there, meeting dealers in derelict shops to dodge security.

It should be noted that, more recently, Khartoum has changed its policy, now allowing foreign currencies to be bought and sold at market prices. From Sudan central bank allows Forex bureaus to determine own exchange rate, May 17, 2012:

May 17, 2012 (KHARTOUM) – Foreign exchange (Forex) bureaus in Sudan will be able to buy and sell currencies using their own exchange rate away from the official one, it was announced today.

[snip]

The move was taken in order to curb the flourishing black market for hard currency and also to attract transfers by Sudanese expatriates abroad, [Deputy Secretary General of Forex Bureaus Union Abdel-Moniem Nur al-Deen] added.

Sources told Al-Shorooq TV that the central bank will soon allow commercial banks to do the same.

Since the secession of oil-rich South Sudan, Sudan has struggled to contain the deteriorating value of its own currency as the flow of hard currency was sharply curtailed.

The US dollar traded for twice the official rate of 2.7 Sudanese pounds despite multiple interventions by the central bank to inject hard currency into the market.

But because of the depleting Forex reserves, the ability of the Central Bank of Sudan to influence the exchange rate on the market has been limited.

Khartoum dispatched several delegations to friendly nations, particularly Arab Gulf states, seeking help but so far only Qatar has made a commitment of $2 billion, which will be used to buy government bonds.

And, with Qatar's help making up over half the value of the investments lost from the US due to the sanctions, the economic situation seems less dire than it could be, though Sudan is still having significant difficulties.

From Qatar to complete purchase of Sudan government bonds by end of April, April 10, 2012:

April 10, 2012 (KHARTOUM) – The Qatari government informed Sudan that it will complete its promised purchase of government issued bonds as part of the deal struck by the leaders of the two countries last month.

[snip]

The report did not mention how much in Sudanese treasury bills Qatar said it will buy except to say that it is "significant". In March, the rich Arab Gulf state pledged a total of $2 billion investments in Sudan including "the purchase of government bonds issued by the Sudanese government and investments in different sectors particularly mining, oil, agriculture and services".

FINANCIAL FATWA

In a related issue the Sudanese finance minister Ali Mahmood Abdel-Rasool urged Islamic scholars in his country to issue a 'Fatwa' (religious decree) allowing the country to borrow using loans with interest.

[snip]

Lacking other immediate ways to finance its deficit, economists say the government may resort to printing money, causing more inflation and further weakening the Sudanese Pound.

Roughly $38 billion in foreign debt, along with US economic sanctions, limits Sudan's access to external financing.

Meanwhile, back in the US, there is a debate about expanding the sanctions. From US congressional committee votes to cut aid from states hosting Sudanese president, from May 17, 2012

May 17, 2012 (WASHINGTON) – A congressional committee in the United States House of Representatives voted to cut off aid to any state that hosts Sudanese president Omer Hassan al-Bashir who is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for his alleged role in Darfur war crimes.

The amendment to the fiscal year 2013 State and Foreign Operations Appropriations bill was pushed for by Frank Wolf who is one of Bashir's most vocal critics.

[snip]

The issue has already drawn concern by some of Wolf's peers in light of its implications on US foreign policy.

"We all agree that the situation in Sudan is deplorable, that President Bashir must be held accountable for his crimes," Democratic Representative Nita Lowey said.

She noted that Bashir has visited many countries including Ethiopia, China, Egypt, Chad, Malawi, Qatar, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

Qatar has significant US military facilities associated with CENTCOM and with our deployment to Afghanistan; additionally, Qatar has the third largest reserves of natural gas in the world, and is the world's largest exporter of natural gas.

In the last passage quoted, Congresswoman Lowey (D - NY 18 CD) brings up a good point; punishing this list of countries may be overzealous, and perhaps not in America's best interests.

Meanwhile, H.R. 4169: Sudan Peace, Security, and Accountability Act of 2012 is, as I write this, in committee in the House.

Victory is Ours, Part 3

Before we proceed with our first article, some context on the author may be in order. Gamal Nkrumah is considered a Pan-Africanist, which is generally considered to be someone who would like to see far greater unity among the people of Africa, and often even among people of African descent from around the world, to help end exploitation of Africa and of Africans for the enrichment of non-Africans.

Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi were also considered to be Pan-Africanists; in fact, Gaddafi took active measures to use Libya's oil wealth to promote a united Africa. One article from The Herald (Zimbabwe) points out how, among other things, Gaddafi foiled one method of European exploitation by helping finance an African communications satellite, which cost Africa $400 million to launch, rather than renting European equipment for $500 million per year.

The financial servitude of Africa is addressed in an interview with Dr. Nkrumah, which also serves to provide more insight into Dr. Nkrumah's perspective, and thus to shed further light on his article. His Pan-Africanist viewpoint is evident in the article reviewed here, and is pertinent.

Now for excerpts from The dark side of Sudan by Gamal Nkrumah, dated April 2012.

At a time when policymakers in Khartoum are focussed on the need to feed the starving millions in Sudan -- a country that could easily become the breadbasket of Africa and the Middle East -- and promote investment in the agrarian sector of the economy, funds are funnelled into Sudan's war machine. Sudanese opposition forces are up in arms.

[snip]

"We would have preferred that the government of President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir adopts a more reconciliatory attitude towards our South Sudanese brothers. His intransigence has led to the division of the country and now his stubbornness and inflexibility will lead to war and devastation," Chairman of Sudan's opposition National Congress Forces (NCF) Farouk Abu Eissa, told Al-Ahram Weekly.

The NCF groups together several moderate opposition parties including the National Umma Party (NUP) and the Popular Congress Party (PCP). The more militant Sudanese Revolutionary Forces (SRF), an umbrella grouping that includes the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) the sister organisation of the ruling SPLM in South Sudan, is especially critical of Khartoum's bellicose mood.

The SRF also incorporate armed opposition groups in Darfur including the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) -- not to be confused with the SPLM and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Militias loyal to the warlike conglomeration have systematically targeted oil installations. The SRF is especially active in the oil-producing border regions especially in Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The Sudanese government forces have proved incapable of containing the guerrilla warfare tactics of the SRF.

The article provides good background on the various groups operating in Sudan, and how they relate to each other. Continuing:

The aerial bombardment by Sudan on South Sudanese border oil producing areas such as Bintui and other garrison towns has left thousands of civilians killed, injured and maimed. In both Sudans observers believe the current low-intensity warfare will inevitably leave the young open to extremists.

Whenever intra-tribal tension flares in the war-torn areas authorities in South Sudan watch for political tension in Sudan and vice versa. More than 75 per cent of the oil produced in what was formerly a united Sudan now lies in territories administered by the independent state of South Sudan. The rest of the oil is produced in adjacent disputed border areas such as Abyei. The latest outburst of violence in the vicinity of Heglig, South Kordofan, has caused a commotion in all the surrounding countryside. The Heglig disturbances threaten to evolve into a devastating war between Sudan and South Sudan. Khartoum accused Juba of instigating tribal tensions and warmongering.

Notice the comment about how each side watches the other during times of increased tribal problems.

The article concludes by pointing out South Sudan's President Kiir warning that he would send troops into Abyei - which has since happened, though it was characterized as "hot pursuit" (see The Inter-Sudan War, Part 4) - and an expectation of a real war.

If Khartoum is instigating trouble in the South, that would make sense why the South watches the North whenever there are tribal troubles. Also, that could explain "hot pursuit".

Each country - Sudan and South Sudan - has internal security problems which are to some extent supported by other side; thus, there is definitely a proxy war going on. However, both Sudan and South Sudan have, in turn, to some extent, become proxies for others.

We now review A playground for proxies, June 16, 2012:

Iran and Israel may become more involved in the Sudanese imbroglio

THE governments of Sudan and South Sudan have been enlisting support from Iran and Israel: not a good omen for peace between north and south. In early May the UN Security Council threatened both Sudans with sanctions unless they stopped fighting and began to discuss how to share oil revenues and demarcate their disputed border. But within weeks a Sudanese delegation went to Iran, where the government promised to strengthen economic ties, oil exploration included. Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, said that his country and Sudan, both facing international sanctions, were victims of "arrogant powers and enemies of mankind".

Since an Islamist-backed military coup brought Sudan's president, Omar al-Bashir, to power in 1989, Shia-run Iran has seen Sunni-dominated Sudan as a useful ally in north-east Africa, and has used Sudan's east side as a corridor for weapons to be smuggled into Egypt and on to Hamas, the Palestinian Islamist group in the Gaza Strip. Israel bombed Iranian convoys on that route in 2009.

Some generals in Khartoum, Sudan's capital, now appear to want to co-operate even more closely with Iran, aiming at South Sudan. An Iranian surveillance drone crashed in Sudanese territory in March after coming under fire from South Sudanese-backed rebels.

Israel is just as keen to help South Sudan. President Salva Kiir and his defence minister recently visited Israel to discuss—among other things—military co-operation, private security deals and oil. Israeli ties to the southerners go back to the 1960s, when they first received arms and training. More recently Israeli security experts have reportedly been working with South Sudan's revamped military. Some say they are helping to train South Sudanese troops to operate the scores of T-72 battle tanks acquired by the government.

There have been unverified reports in the Israeli press that Iranian weapons seized in a Nigerian port in 2010 were intended to be smuggled through Chad to Sudan and Gaza. In February Israel's ambassador to the UN said that Israel was worried that west Africa had become a hub for Hizbullah, Lebanon's fiercely anti-Israeli, Iranian-backed party-cum-militia. No wonder that peace talks between Sudan and South Sudan are deadlocked.

Some of this was previously addressed at posts here. For example, in Unity and Faith, Part 4, we looked at the weapons being moved through Nigeria. Of course, we also looked at the Iranian heroin being moved through Nigeria - a topic that does not get as much attention elsewhere. ;)

If it turns out that Iran and Israel are getting involved in the Sudans, that turn of events would certainly have broader ramifications.

But that may only be the first layer under the surface. Farther down may indeed be another layer of proxy fighting.

We return to two excerpts that we had skipped from The dark side of Sudan by Gamal Nkrumah, the first near the beginning, and the second at the very end:

The age of hydrocarbons isn't over as far as the two Sudans are concerned. The world's largest oil companies facing the faltering war economies of Sudan are looking to buy growth in other developing countries in Africa. The risks of investing in oil production in Sudan deter all but the most intrepid investors such as the Chinese.

[snip]

"I personally expect full-fledged war," [said] Mariam Al-Mahdi, opposition politician and daughter of Umma Party leader, the former Sudanese prime minister Sadig Al-Mahdi. She alluded to the analogy that the current border skirmishes are like a preview to a full-scale war between Sudan and South Sudan. A rash of international oil companies is snapping up stakes in the two countries' oil wealth. They have succeeded in whipping up an anti-Sudanese rancour, particularly if the Sudanese opposition's attempts to tame Khartoum go horribly awry.

Notice two things: 1) Sudan, especially its oil, is being exploited by non-Africans; and, 2) the Chinese are high on the list of exploiters.

As we learned in The Inter-Sudan War, Part 5, China receives about 67% of Sudan's oil exports - when Sudan is exporting - and this accounts for 5% of China's oil needs.

I can't help but wonder if a nation potentially hostile to China might be involved here, jeopardizing China's investments and disrupting the flow of oil to China. And, I can think of only one superpower that has been reasonably involved in the Sudans that might wish to see China have problems there.

From China's Oil Supply Dependence by David L. O. Hayward (a retired Australian military officer who has written analytical papers on China's dependence on oil imports and related geographic, political and military considerations), June 18, 2009:

China's economic expansion has placed it on a collision course with global competitors in the market for scarce resources including critical oil and gas supplies. The PRC accounted for nearly 40% of the increase in global oil consumption between 2004 and 2007. In a short period of time, China has evolved from a position as an oil exporter in 1992 to the world's second largest oil importer in May 2008.

[snip]

China began to suffer from oil supply shortages in 2007. These shortages led to price increases in petrol and diesel of up to 18% in June 2008. In an effort to boost domestic oil production, China has invited foreign investment in its oil infrastructure. With a shortfall of some 160,000 b/d predicted for 2010, China has asked six countries to help fill this gap. The UK, South Korea, Russia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), US and Saudi Arabia have jumped on the bandwagon. Joint venture proposals with CNPC largely relate to the mainland based refining sector and include British Petroleum (BP), South Korea's SK and LG, Russia's Rosneft, a United Arab Emirates (UAE) led investor group, ExxonMobil Corporation, and various Saudi oil enterprises. Even though in 2008 China may be able to ramp up its refinery capacity by approximately 54.5 million tons, there is still the likelihood of a gaping shortfall in oil supply.

[snip]

Sudan

Additionally, China has implemented a powerful "oil for guns" programme with Sudan. With the exception of Russia, this country has become China's largest overseas oil investment. CNPC owns 40% of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, a consortium that dominates Sudan's oil fields. CNPC has invested more than US$8B in the Sudanese oil sector, including funding for new oil pipelines. Another Chinese company, Sinopec is constructing a 1,500 km pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. China is also building a new tanker terminal at this port possibly to handle very large crude carrier (VLCC) tankers. Sudan now supplies China with 10% of its total oil imports.

[snip]

The momentum could be self-perpetuating.

(4.) China sees itself as the leader of a new world economic order, to eventually become the world's leading economy by 2020/30 and to thereby acquire a dominant hegemonic position in world affairs and geopolitics. The country is deliberately posturing itself for future domination of the West.

(5.) Being "cashed up" with some US$1.95 trillion in forex reserves, China possibly will never again have such a golden opportunity to acquire crude oil/gas assets (and other worldwide energy resources) at such a low cost, while the global financial meltdown continues. Effectively, the People's Bank of China is close to becoming the world’s de facto banker and has mounted a serious challenge to the IMF, to the Arab petrodollar and to overseas financial institutions. The artificially induced low value of the Yuan has permitted China to rapidly build up its forex reserves. "Thanks for your US dollar, here's your change expressed in a foreign exchange certificate, as fifty Fens or otherwise." This is a form of "hard currency larceny". How could the West be so naive and allow itself to be financially ambushed in this manner?

(6.) China seeks to buy crude oil/gas (plus other energy resources) as it realizes these valuable commodities are finite and exhaustible. The rate of discovery of new and significant oil reserves is dramatically falling and most existing oil/gas fields have surpassed their peak. The age of easy oil is over, and what remaining oil there is will become increasingly technically difficult to extract.

(7.) China intends to greatly increase its official strategic reserve of oil (and LNG/gas products). The first annual phase of the PRC's strategic petroleum reserve is due to be completed in 2009. The reserve will hold 100 million barrels of oil (m/bo). The second annual phase is planned to hold 200 m/bo. If this annual rate of stockpiling is successful, China will launch successive phases. This may eventually increase net storage capacity to beyond 500 m/bo sometime after 2013. Should this occur the storage volume will be the largest national strategic oil reserve the world has ever known.

Having such a large strategic reserve, to the obvious disadvantage of other world powers, means that China can effectively mount a sustained conventional manpower- abundant military campaign (defensive/offensive) without the need for recourse to limited-theatre nuclear weapons and WMD. The West will be tactically impaired and might have to be the first to use nuclear weapons to impede any Chinese advances/gains.

Interesting.

Of course, as China's demand for oil increases, there is increased competition with other customers to buy the world's oil.

But, as the squeeze gets put on China's oil supply, this opens up the field for investment in China's oil infrastructure, and big American oil companies are among those that would be in the competition to help develop new refineries - ExxonMobil was specifically mentioned.

On the other hand, though, China trades its weapons for oil, supplying Sudan. Sudan is considered by the US Government to be a state sponsor of terrorism, and is the de facto enemy of South Sudan, a nation that has very cordial relations with the United States. In fact, the oil situation has significant geostrategic ramifications for the US, going so far as to help predict who would be first to use nuclear weapons in a Sino-American fight - though Sudan is worth only 5% of China's oil situation.

If the oil flow is cut off from Sudan - and it is - this will negatively impact the Chinese, and could prompt opportunities for investment by American firms to build China's oil infrastructure, while keeping China from making sales of weapons and while keeping China from arming the regime in Khartoum, which is considered hostile to US interests.

That would be a nice package for America, don't you think?

What else is interesting is the close relationship that has developed between China and Iran. From pages 5-7 (pgs 19-21 of 48 as you open the pdf) of China and Iran Economic, Political, and Military Relations, written this year by Scott Harold and Alireza Nader (numbers in superscript refer to footnotes in the original):

To a considerable extent, the Islamic Republic has become dependent on China as the regime's chief diplomatic protector in the face of internal and external pressures. In contrast to Western powers, China is unconcerned with the Iranian regime’s internal behavior. The regime's brutal suppression of the 2009 protest movement and its wider human rights abuses were met with silence from Beijing; China may have even provided active assistance in monitoring and suppressing Iranian opposition forces (through the provision of telecommunications tracking technology and crowd control devices).⁹

[snip]

4. Iran's Military Modernization Has Been Facilitated by China

China has aided Iran's efforts to modernize its military hardware and doctrine. As noted previously, the PRC was an essential provider of military hardware during Iran's eight-year struggle with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Iran's rupture with the United States severely impeded its ability to conduct its war with Iraq, while the Soviet Union and such major Western powers as France supplied Baghdad with military hardware while refusing similar assistance to Iran. Chinese military sales to Iran were often provided indirectly and discreetly through third-party sale/transfers carried out via countries such as North Korea, but they were recognized by Tehran as a critical form of support.¹⁰

China not only sold Iran small arms; it also supplied Iran with tactical ballistic and antiship cruise missiles. Indeed, Iran's use of Silkworm missiles against Kuwaiti shipping in 1987 became a significant source of tension between China and the United States.¹¹ China eventually agreed to stop sales of the Silkworm and the more sophisticated C-802 missiles to Iran.¹²

But instead of directly selling missiles to Iran, China played a crucial role in starting up Iran's indigenous military-industrial sector, greatly helping Iran's military modernization efforts. Chinese design and technology can be seen in many Iranian missile series, from the short-range Oghab and Nazeat missiles to the long-range Shahab 3.¹³ In addition, Iran has developed its own relatively sophisticated antiship cruise missiles with Chinese help. These include the Nasr, which is reported as being nearly identical to the Chinese C-704. According to some reports, China even helped Iran establish a plant for the manufacture of the Nasr in 2010.¹⁴ China is also reported to have provided Iran with advanced antiship mines and fast attack boats.¹⁵ The total value of these transfers is difficult to know for certain but has been estimated by some analysts to range from a low of $4 billion to possibly as high as $10 billion.¹⁶

Such transfers of weapons and technological know-how have continued despite international sanctions, with one observer reporting allegations that Chinese arms suppliers have agreed to deliver weapon systems with the serial numbers filed off so as to obscure their origin.¹⁷ In some cases, China is suspected of transferring ballistic missile technology to Iran via North Korea.¹⁸ Even more troubling are allegations that Chinese and Iranian defense cooperation has also extended to covertly developing Iran's chemical weapons program.¹⁹

Iran's ballistic missiles and naval capabilities form the core of its military doctrine vis-à-vis the United States. Lacking an advanced air force, Iran aims to project military power through the use of its missile forces, which can be used to deter the United States or retaliate against the United States or its regional allies in the event of a military conflict. Additionally, Iran's naval capabilities can be used to disrupt shipping in the Persian Gulf, potentially inflicting pressure on the United States to end any future military conflict on terms favorable to Iran.

That's a great deal of important support that China is giving Iran: diplomatic cover, arms, technology, economic support in the face of sanctions...

I wonder if all China is getting in return is a dedicated supplier of oil?

The Sudans seem to be supporting militias and armed groups, each in the territory of the other.

However, it appears that Sudan is receiving extensive support from Iran, a fellow Islamic regime; though Sudan is Sunni and Iran is Shi'ite, they seem to have a great deal in common, including common enemies. South Sudan, for its part, seems to be receiving significant assistance from Israel.

Since Iran and Israel are not on the friendliest of terms - indeed, the government in Tehran seldom if ever misses an opportunity to call for Israel's destruction and to assure the world such destruction is coming - the situation between the Sudans could be developing, as addressed in the Economist, as a proxy war.

But I wonder if Iran is not receiving encouragement from China, and Israel from the United States, each to tie the other down, and each to impact the other's sponsor; in other words, the militias and armed groups are proxies of the Sudans, the Sudans are proxies of Iran and Israel, but are Iran and Israel to some extent proxies of China and the US, playing out a "Great Game" in northeast Africa?

Victory is Ours, Part 2

In Part 1 we looked at Bashir's Islamist government in Khartoum; we examined some controversy surrounding the regime's version of sharia, and we considered further evidence of the regime's lawlessness, in this case regarding blatant murder of a UN contractor right under the noses of UN peacekeepers last summer. We concluded that Bashir's regime comprises the "bad guys" for this war.

In this post, we begin to examine the situation in South Sudan more closely, with a focus on problems the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) faces.

First and foremost, today is the first anniversary of the independence of the Republic of South Sudan: Happy Independence Day!

On this anniversary, President Kiir delivered a speech with a focus on the economy. We examine South Sudan anniversary: Salva Kiir focuses on economy, from July 9, 2012:

South Sudan's President Salva Kiir has said the world's newest country needs to be "independent economically" in his speech to mark the first anniversary of its independence.

Thousands of people danced and waved flags during official celebrations in the capital, Juba.

The BBC's Nyambura Wambugu, in Juba, says that few South Sudanese have seen much improvement in their lives.

But she says that most feel it has been a good year, despite the problems.

Our correspondent says it has also been a turbulent 12 months, with ethnic conflict in Jonglei State killing hundreds, conflict on the border with Sudan and a huge corruption scandal.

'Short man from Khartoum'

Mr Kiir told the crowd: "We still depend on others. Our liberty today is incomplete. We must be more than liberated. We have to be independent economically.

The economic liberation that President Kiir refers to largely involves the situation regarding oil. As the article mentions toward the end, South Sudan controls 75% of the oil from Sudan prior to the split. Going back to early posts dealing with the situation in Sudan, we wondered what would happen with the oil; most of the oil is located in the south, but the pipelines to get it to port facilities, and the port facilities themselves, are located in the North. South Sudan can't export its oil and cash in without cooperation from the North. However, Sudan - the North - will not make much money without working a deal with the South to charge transit fees for helping bring the South's oil to market.

In the long term, GoSS could work a deal with neighboring countries to build a pipeline to port facilities. The trouble is, the only country South Sudan borders which has a coast is Kenya. The other option would be to take the oil through Ethiopia and then through 1) Eritrea, 2) Djibouti or 3) Somalia. Eritrea is a diplomatically isolated nation, kind of like North Korea, run by a rather paranoid dictator; Djibouti has a US AFRICOM base and a French Foreign Legion base, but has not been untouched by the unrest that has rocked the Arab world in the past eighteen months; and Somalia is in an ongoing state of civil war, though northern Somalia is relatively stable. Politically and militarily, northern Somalia or Djibouti might work the best, though the pipeline would may have to run through the state of Jonglei, both the largest and most populous in South Sudan, and which is currently seeing a great deal of tribal infighting (see below); geographically, the part of Somalia rocked by civil war and pirates might be the best.

Regardless, in the short term, disputes over percentages and accusations of theft of oil have resulted in the South shutting down the flow of oil through the North, with a resulting impact on revenues for both Sudans. Since the proceeds from the export of oil made up a greater percentage of the budget for the government in the South than for Bashir's regime in the North, this may have a greater impact on the government in Juba than on Bashir's government in Khartoum.

In fact, in The Inter-Sudan War, Part 5, we examined rather closely the impact of this situation regarding the shut-down of the flow of oil, and I wondered if Bashir hadn't deliberately provoked this, since his regime is in a better position to weather the storm.

Regarding the gravity of the fiscal situation in Juba, we consider an excerpt from South Sudan Has Foreign Exchange Reserves for 18 Months, March 9, 2012 (see original for further information and links which I did not reproduce):

South Sudan, which shut down its oil industry in January, has enough foreign exchange reserves to last 18 months and is exploring new ways to raise cash including issuing bonds, Vice President Riek Machar said.

The African nation will post a budget deficit next year as a result of lost oil revenue, Machar predicted in an interview in New York today after visiting investors. To close the gap, the country may seek commercial loans, sell bonds overseas and truck at least a third of its oil production to ports in other nations, he said.

South Sudan, which gained control of about 75 percent of the previously united Sudan's 490,000 barrels a day of output at independence in July, completed a shutdown of production Jan. 28. It took the action after accusing Sudan of stealing its oil. Sudan said it confiscated the crude to make up for unpaid fees.

The dispute over the fees South Sudan pays the neighboring country to ship the crude via a pipeline to the Red Sea shows few signs of being resolved anytime soon. Oil accounts for more than 95 percent of the economy of South Sudan, according to the government.

Vice President Riek Machar - remember that name. He's on the right in the photo below.

In any case, the government in Juba is facing economic challenges at a time when it also faces internal unrest and an external threat from the North.

Regarding this latter threat, during the independence day celebrations, South Sudan has received some encouragement from Uganda. Skipping down in South Sudan anniversary: Salva Kiir focuses on economy:

Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni said his country would support South Sudan in its struggle with "the short man from Khartoum" - seen as a reference to Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir.

I am characterizing the situation between the two Sudans as an ongoing war, although it seems to not be terribly hot at the moment. Most of the rest of the world seems to think it is not a war, but a war is possible. Regardless, IRIN News had the following to say about the situation with the North in Briefing: South Sudan one year on from independence, July 9, 2012 (see original for links that I did not reproduce):

What are the prospects for defusing tensions with Khartoum?

Months of talks led by the African Union have yet to bear fruit. In early April, the two Sudans embarked on a month-long war on the undefined border they had agreed to start demarcating. South Sudan occupied oil fields in a disputed area that produces around half of Sudan's oil output, while Khartoum's counter-insurgency operations have included bombing raids allegedly up to 70km inside South Sudan.

Security agreements, including on a demilitarized zone along the border, have stalled, and each side claims the other is funding rebel groups within its borders.

Sudan has repeatedly accused South Sudan of supporting rebels in the border states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile who during the 1983-2005 civil war were part of the southern Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army. Juba maintains that the northern wing of the insurgency, SPLA-N, has operated independently since secession.

However, one source reports a possible ray of light regarding hostilities with Khartoum. Sudan and South Sudan pledge to end hostilities, dated July 7, 2012, has South Sudan's Chief Negotiator Pagan Amum and Sudan's Defense Minister Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein, meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, with chief mediator and former South African President Thabo Mbeki, agreeing to commit to a cessation of hostilities and negotiation. (I don't buy it.)

Farther down in Briefing: South Sudan one year on from independence, we have this (again, I did not reproduce links found in the original):

What about internal conflict?

Ethnic clashes and cattle-rustling in a country awash with guns are a serious threat to stability. Thousands of people have been killed in cattle rustling incidents and related violence.

In late December, up to 8,000 youths from the Lou Nuer ethnic group, joined by some Dinka, marched on members of the minority Murle in neglected Jonglei State, killing hundreds, according to the UN, and thousands according to local officials.

The violence displaced over 160,000 people, and spawned a host of smaller attacks in which hundreds more were killed. This prompted a large-scale civilian disarmament operation in Jonglei State.

While South Sudan has followed a policy of "paying for peace" by integrating militias into its already swollen army, analysts say a worrying trend in the politicization of ethnic groups could see the nation turn on itself if the government fails to prosecute those responsible for attacks.

The incident mentioned was pretty significant. From South Sudan horror at deadly cattle vendetta, January 16, 2012:

An age-old vendetta between two communities known for stealing each other's cattle, women and children recently escalated to unknown proportions when over 6,000 armed Lou Nuer youths marched on Pibor to attack the Murle.

[snip]

A figure speedily produced by Pibor's county commissioner of more than 3,000 dead remains unverified.

This would make it South Sudan's worst conflict since it gained independence from Sudan in July 2011.

County medical officer James Chacha witnessed the attacks and thinks "2,000 plus" were killed by attackers en route to Pibor town, that he says stationed troops struggled to defend.

"In fact they came and they entered the town. The deployment was not that big to cover the headquarters itself", and surrounding villages felt the full force of attacks, he said.

Mr Chacha said around 800 government troops in Pibor only fired on attackers when they had been driven back.

The UN Mission in South Sudan (Unmiss) had 400 peacekeepers in Pibor at the time of the attack and has increased numbers to 1,000.

"That represents almost half of the UN's 2,100 combat ready personnel", who will be sent to reinforce densely populated areas, said Unmiss official Kouider Zerrouk.

The attacks pushed all the way into Pibor, where government troops, outnumbered more than 7 to 1, had trouble just defending themselves.

As the series continues, we will look more in depth into the internal security situation in South Sudan.

Victory is Ours, Part 1

The introduction to this series reviewed what we had learned of Sudan so far, providing links to previous posts. We now set the stage by examining the situation in the two Sudans - both in the Republic of Sudan, the "North", which could be considered "rump Sudan" after the South declared its independence in the wake of a referendum, and the Republic of South Sudan, or the South. In this post, we examine the North.

The key thing to keep in mind is that Sudan is run by indicted war criminal Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, who seized power in a coup in 1989. At the time, Bashir was a colonel in the Sudanese Army. The coup was bloodless, but was backed by Islamist forces. Bashir, who fought alongside the Egyptian Army against Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, introduced an Islamic legal code in Sudan upon seizing power. More recently, he stated that if the South secedes - which it did - he would make Sudan a state governed by sharia.

Sudan's President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir

Though Bashir's Islamist background does not get a great deal of attention in literature dealing with the situation in the Sudans, it is a factor under the surface which, I believe, has very significant impact on the overall regional situation, especially including the trouble with South Sudan, as well as globally.

To get an idea what Bashir's idea of sharia is - it is not substantially different from sharia as implemented elsewhere - we begin by considering a situation that developed regarding Lubna Ahmed al-Hussein.

Lubna al-Hussein is a Sudanese Muslim. Significantly for Sudan, she is a woman. She was working for UNMIS (UNMIS - United Nations Mission in Sudan; its mandate ended on July 9, 2011, with the independence of South Sudan) when, on July 3, 2009, at a cousin's wedding, Sudanese Public Order Police showed up looking for any women wearing trousers. Along with other women, she was arrested. Ten of the women pled guilty immediately and were given ten lashes each and released. Hussein and two others insisted on a trial.

I now reproduce in its entirety (including two links) an editorial, written by Hussein, telling her story; When I think of my trial, I pray my fight won't be in vain by Lubna al-Hussein, September 3, 2009:

For wearing trousers, I face 40 lashes. This is the brutal reality of Sudan: we live in fear of those who should protect us

Next week I will stand trial in a Sudanese court, charged along with 12 other women with committing an "indecent act" – wearing trousers in a public place. I will face up to 40 lashes and an unlimited fine if I am convicted of breaching Article 152 of Sudanese law, which prohibits dressing indecently in public. As an employee of the UN I was offered immunity, and the chance to escape trial, but I chose to resign from the UN so that I could face the Sudanese authorities and make them show to the world what they consider justice to be.

It will seem absurd to many people that a woman could face this situation in a country that claims to be "the Dubai of the Nile". Much international media coverage of Sudan in recent years may have focused on issues of conflict. But at the same time my country has reaped millions in oil revenues; skyscrapers and modern hotels have sprung up across our capital city, and although the living conditions of most ordinary people have not improved, our government has promised that we are on the path to prosperity.

And my case is far from an isolated one. In fact the director of police has admitted that 43,000 women were arrested in Khartoum state in 2008 for clothing offences. When asked, he couldn't say how many of these women had been flogged. And it's not just about clothing. After my arrest, two girls were arrested in a public place and the police discovered that their mobile phones had video clips of scenes from the hugely popular Arab soap Noor and Mohannad in which the main characters kiss each other. The girls were charged with pornography and given 40 lashes.

In many such cases the court consists of just one policeman and a single judge – with the policeman acting as the complainant, prosecutor and sole witness. And in a growing number of cases, the accused don't even reach court. One man, in dread of what might happen to him, died recently after falling off a building where he had sought shelter after being chased by the security police.

The laws under which we live have not modernised with our economy. Despite a new constitution in 2005, a comprehensive peace agreement and the protocol of human rights, women are still constrained – not only in their freedom of dress but also their freedom to work. Journalists are prevented from speaking out and people are detained without reason.

This is not new: Sudan has a proud and sad history of courageous men and women who have had to fight against repressive laws. They taught me that we should not hide behind privilege but that we should speak out for those who cannot find their voice. My trial next week may put Sudanese justice in the spotlight for a moment. But I hope that people will not look away once my verdict is announced, because there are many greater challenges that await us.

When North and South Sudan signed a peace agreement after 20 years of brutal civil war, both promised to respect international human rights, to overturn repressive laws and prevent the atrocities of the past being repeated. But the censorship, harassment and detention of journalists and human rights defenders continues.

Next spring our country will face elections. Opposition parties will not be able to fight these elections unless the laws are changed to be compatible with our new constitution. The elections are one step towards a referendum in which our brothers and sisters from the South will decide whether they want to remain in a united Sudan or to create a country of their own. These are painful and difficult choices that will decide the future for generations to come.

I feel anger and frustration that our government will not allow people to freely discuss our future. Sudan is a great country and one rich in diversity of faith, beliefs and ways of being. It has enough resources to provide for all its people. But it will never fulfil its great potential unless we are able to contribute to our future without pressure or fear.

When I think of my trial, I pray that my daughters will never live in fear of these "police of security of society". We will only be secure once the police protect us and these laws are repealed. I also pray that the next generation will see we had the courage to fight for their future before it was too late. We need Arab, African, American and European leaders to stand with us and help us make sure that the next chapter of our history is less bloody and brutal than the last. This will require conviction and boldness from their side. I hope they will display the qualities of those Sudanese men and women I most admire.

Some background to and significance of the story can be found at Pants Pants Revolution, dated August 5, 2009; here are the first three paragraphs:

Khartoum -- To the media she is the "Sudan trouser woman." Images of Lubna Hussein wearing the outfit that led to her arrest in Khartoum last month have zipped around the world. News reports give the impression that she is a radical on a crusade, her trial a fight over women's rights in an Islamic capital city. But this impression fails to scratch the surface. What is at stake is no less than a burgeoning social movement that promises to test the authoritarian Sudanese government on a global stage.

Hussein is one of thousands of women arrested each year for one of the "public order" offenses listed in Sudan's criminal code. Article 152, the one relevant to Hussein's case, reads: "Whoever commits an indecent act or an act that breaches public morality or wears clothes that are indecent or would breach public morality which causes annoyance to public feelings is liable to forty lashes or fine or both punishments."

The laws are officially meant to keep the public safe. But in practice, public order police use the vaguely worded regulations to extract bribes from women on the street, while public order justices deliver immediate punishment for infractions, devoid of due process. This means that public order laws are the subject of suppressed but persistent debate inside Sudan.

Notice this last paragraph, about how laws meant to keep the public safe are instead used to oppress the people. :)

The article goes on with a little history, explains how Hussein had immunity due to her work for the UN but waived it to go to trial and draw attention to this law, and talks about how the incident has caused reform-minded activists to start working more closely together. But, it also explains the government's strategy of delay, hoping international attention will die down.

Interestingly, the world's feminists were conspicuously silent on the matter. This lack of feminist response was discussed on the BBC, where commentary addressed how the world's feminists dislike intervening in indigenous cultures.

However, my observation is that the West's feminists sure don't seem to mind when foreigners come to the West and intervene in our cultures, bringing this kind of oppression, in this case sharia, to our lands. Make no mistake about it: when guys like Bashir and the mullahs he empowers take charge here in the West - and that is happening - those feminists who are militant and hypocritical, whose only real goal is the destruction of Western society, will find that they had been sheltered by the very system they loved to hate.

Regardless, in the event, initial court proceedings against Hussein were marked by violent police oppression of her supporters. From Sudan police beat protesters as woman goes on trial for wearing trousers, August 4, 2009:

Police fired teargas and beat supporters of a Sudanese woman facing 40 lashes for wearing trousers in public shortly before her trial was adjourned this morning.

Police in Khartoum moved in swiftly and dispersed about 50 protesters, mostly women, who were supporting Lubna Hussein, a former UN worker charged with "indecent dressing" in violation of the country's Islamic laws.

Some of the women demonstrators wore trousers in solidarity with Hussein. "We are here to protest against this law that oppresses women and debases them," said Amal Habani, a female columnist for the daily newspaper Ajraa al-Hurria (Bells of Freedom).

Ultimately, Hussein was convicted and sentenced to a fine, which she refused to pay. She was then jailed until the country's journalists' union paid the fine on her behalf. However, from INTERVIEW - Sudanese woman in trouser case defies travel ban, November 23, 2009:

Hussein said the group that paid her fine had close ties to the Sudanese government, which wanted to end the case quietly.

She said she planned to pursue her campaign through the courts and would ultimately go to the African Court of Justice if necessary.

"I have received a lot of threats. Some were outright death threats. But I have faith, and I believe that I will die the day that I am meant to die," she said.

To give a further taste of the flavor of government repression in Sudan, we now turn our attention to some atrocities committed by government forces in the summer of last year, right under the eyes of the UN.

A report entitled In Close Proximity: alleged abduction, detention and extrajudicial killings by Abu Tira, dated October 13, 2011, and published by Harvard Humanitarian Initiative's Satellite Sentinel Project (website), documents the flagrant and blatant murder by Sudan's security forces of a contractor working with the UN, right in front of UNMIS peacekeepers, in addition to other atrocities in close proximity to the UNMIS Compound. In [brackets] I have added explanations and links.

Abductions and Killings

According to multiple sources, fighting in Kadugli started on 5 June. An eyewitness account collected by SSP [Satellite Sentinel Project] alleges that IDPs [internally displaced persons] abducted from the UNMIS compound on 6 June were taken to an area between the CRP [Sudan's Central Reserve Police, armed much more heavily than regular police forces, including mortars, heavy machineguns and, on occasions, artillery; weapons that are far to indiscriminate for what westerners would consider "police" activities] training center and the UN compound and reportedly killed there. Their bodies were dumped in a nearby riverbed, according to the eyewitness. In a similar incident, the August 2011 UNHCHR [UN HIgh Commissioner for Refugees] report describes armed CRP personnel moving in and out of the UNMIS protective perimeter on 8 June, conducting identity checks among the IDPs there. CRP forces reportedly abducted three IDPs suspected of supporting the SPLM-N [Sudan People's Liberation Movement - North].

Also, SSP has received an eyewitness report alleging that CRP, SAF [Sudanese Armed Forces], and PDF [Popular Defense Forces - a paramilitary organization now becoming more important for political organization activities] forces tied civilians to the gates of the Kadugli airport checkpoint on 8 June and beat them. Witness reports communicated to SSP claim that those individuals were later shot and killed, and subsequently buried in a nearby mass grave.

The Murder of Numeiri Philip Kalo

An eyewitness report received directly by SSP contradicts core aspects of the August 2011 UNHCHR report's account of the 8 June abduction and murder of a UN individual contractor. SSP has learned that the contractor, Numeiri Philip Kalo, a Nuba man and known SPLM-N supporter, worked for Tri-Star Fueling and was a Catholic seminarian. SSP has identified discrepancies regarding this incident between witness reports, the leaked UNHCHR draft and the final version of that report released in August 2011.

Eyewitness reports communicated directly to SSP claim that on 8 June Numeiri Philip Kalo, among others, was pulled out of an UNMIS vehicle directly in front of the east main gate of the UNMIS compound. CRP personnel reportedly put Numeiri Philip Kalo in a CRP-operated Toyota Land Cruiser. The CRP then took him around the corner of the UNMIS compound, near the CRP training center, and shot him while Egyptian UNMIS peacekeepers looked on. Eyewitness reports communicated to SSP state that Kalo's body was riddled with bullet holes when it was dumped out of a moving CRP vehicle on the road in front of the CRP training center. An individual who spoke to SSP independently identified the CRP training center on a map, and stated that Numeiri Philip Kalo's body was reportedly dumped on the side of the road in front of the CRP facility.

However, the August 2011 UNHCHR report states that on "8 June, an UNMIS individual contractor (IC) was pulled out of a vehicle by SAF in front of the UNMIS Kadugli Sector IV compound in the presence of several witnesses." The draft report included a notation that this occurred "while UN Peace keepers could not intervene." This point was not included in the final report. Both versions of the report continued with the following language: "He was taken away from the vicinity of the compound and gunshots were heard. Later he was discovered dead by UNMIS personnel and IDPs. Several sources confirmed that the victim was an active SPLM member." Neither version of the UNHCHR report mentions CRP personnel or the CRP facility.

Some key things to conclude: 1) (North) Sudan essentially has no rulebook when it comes to armed conflict; Bashir's forces will do whatever they feel they need to do to win; 2) peacekeeping is a joke; the peacekeepers can't even protect themselves; 3) official UN reports do not tell the whole story even about what is happening to people working for the UN, much less about the local people.

So, Bashir and his government in Khartoum are the bad guys.

However, as this series continues, we will explore some problems with our good guys in South Sudan.

In the Eyes of a Stranger, Part 2

In Part 1 we considered the serious problem of sexual assault that faces our military service personnel. Women in particular are victimized, though there is a real problem with men being assaulted. I am very pained to report that the topic has come onto the front burner again.

The Air Force currently faces a scandal at Lackland Air Force Base (AFB), TX. We begin with an excerpt from 31 Female Victims and Counting in Air Force Sexual Assault Scandal, June 29, 2012:

In what's probably the worst sex assault scandal in the U.S. military in the last 20 years, Air force officials have determined that 31 women have been identified as victims of sexual misconduct and assault at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas, where 12 male boot-camp instructors are under investigation for allegedly raping, assaulting, harassing, and having sex with female recruits.

Next, we consider excerpts from 31 female victims identified so far in sex scandal, Air Force says, June 30, 2012

Six of the 12 instructors under investigation for misconduct face charges ranging from rape to adultery. A senior Air Force commander said nine of those instructors were in the same squadron, briefing reporters at the Pentagon at the same time that one of the accused appeared in a Lackland courtroom.

[snip]

Gen. Edward Rice, commander of the Air Education and Training Command [AETC], said the Air Force believes the misconduct is not endemic to the nine training squadrons [of the 37th Training Group, the unit which conducts basic military training for Air Force recruits at Lackland - EL]. He says the sexual misconduct apparently began in 2009 but that the first woman came forward only a year ago.

Those first allegations were levied against Staff Sgt. Luis Walker, who faces the most serious charges and is scheduled to be court-martialed next month [scheduled to begin July 16 - EL]. Walker is charged with 28 counts, including rape, aggravated sexual contact and multiple counts of aggravated sexual assault. He has not yet entered a plea [other sources show SSgt Walker has pled "not guilty" to all counts - EL].

The majority of the instructors under investigation were in the 331st Training Squadron, whose commander was relived from his post last week. Rice said Lt. Col. Mike Paquette, who has not been accused of misconduct, was relieved because of the "unacceptable level" of misbehavior in his unit.

For context, we go back to 31 Female Victims and Counting in Air Force Sexual Assault Scandal (I reproduced the link found in the original):

To understand just how bad this sexual assault scandal is, you need to understand Lackland Air Force Base and its relationship to the Air Force. Located just outside San Antonio, it's where some 36,000 recruits undertake basic training each year. "Lackland is where every American airman reports for basic training – about 35,000 a year. About one in five are female, pushed through eight weeks of basic training by a flight of instructors that are about 90 percent male," report the AP's Lolita Baldor and Paul Weber.

The accused were military training instructors (MTIs). From Lackland trainer bragged of sex, witnesses say, June 29, 2012, which addresses the Article 32 hearing (a preliminary hearing named for the article of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) which mandates it) concerning the accusations against Staff Sergeant Craig LeBlanc:

The prosecution spent a good deal of time establishing the control trainers have over recruits during 8½ weeks of boot camp and whether they still have that control between the Friday when they graduate and early Monday morning when they leave Lackland.

[snip]

"Did you always follow an MTIs orders?" prosecuting attorney Capt. Kaylynn Shoop asked the airman, 19.

"We didn't have a choice," she said. "Nothing an MTI says is with a question mark."

It always was made abundantly clear, she said, that not following an order would have an adverse effect on a recruit's career in the Air Force.

She testified that LeBlanc and another military trainer, Staff Sgt. Kwinton Estacio, urged her and another recruit to meet them in the supply room. The pair "pinky swore" that they wouldn't have sex with the men.

More information about the alleged misconduct came out at the Article 32 hearing of Staff Sergeant Kwinton Estacio. From Female airmen testify about sex acts with MTIs, June 2, 2012:

When questioned by Capt. Kaylynn Shoop, one of the prosecutors, the now 19-year-old airman described Estacio as a tough and strict MTI.

The airman also said she trusted Estacio.

"He's like a mentor, a role model," she said. "You work with him for eight and a half weeks and he teaches you so many things you didn't think you could do. A lot of us wanted to be like him. He was like a father."

General Rice, the AETC commander under whose authority recruit training at Lackland AFB ultimately falls, has indicated that his investigation thus far shows that the problem is mainly centered around one training squadron, and not permeating the recruit training program at Lackland.

Edward A. Rice, Jr.
General, US Air Force
Commander, USAF AETC

However, in general, the problem of sexual assault does permeate the US military. The Air Force maintains a Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program, which takes its definition of sexual assault and consent substantially from Air Force Instruction 36-6001; there are differences, so I quote AFI 36-6001:

Sexual Assault — The following definition of sexual assault has been directed by DoD and is for training and educational purposes only. This definition does not affect in any way the definition of any offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Commanders are encouraged to consult with their Staff Judge Advocate for complete understanding of this definition in relation to the UCMJ.

Sexual Assault is defined as intentional sexual contact, characterized by use of force, threats, intimidation, abuse of authority, or when the victim does not or cannot consent. Sexual assault includes rape, forcible sodomy (oral or anal sex), and other unwanted sexual contact that is aggravated, abusive, or wrongful (to include unwanted and inappropriate sexual contact), or attempts to commit these acts.

"Consent" means words or overt acts indicating a freely given agreement to the sexual conduct at issue by a competent person. An expression of lack of consent through words or conduct means there is no consent. Lack of verbal or physical resistance or submission resulting from the accused's use of force, threat of force, or placing another person in fear does not constitute consent. A current or previous dating relationship by itself or the manner of dress of the person involved with the accused in the sexual conduct at issue shall not constitute consent.

Notice in the second paragraph the phrase regarding abuse of authority and in the third paragraph the phrase about submission resulting from fear.

The case against these MTIs illustrates these aspects. The MTI's word is essentially law while the recruit is under the MTI's authority; failure to do what the MTI says could easily get the recruit prosecuted. With this authority comes responsibility; the MTI is expected to behave in an exemplary manner and to use this authority in a wise, moral and lawful manner. Generally speaking, the military teaches recruits to obey orders; this process would be made much more difficult if recruits were simultaneously taught to question their superiors. Indeed, how could a military fight a war if personnel were constantly questioning and debating the orders they receive? It is incumbent upon military authorities, especially in the case of MTIs, to be well within bounds regarding their conduct, especially including orders and anything that could be construed as an order, such as a request or suggestion.

The need for appropriate conduct by military authorities should be obvious. From An Air Force War on Sexual Assault by Anna Mulrine, January, 2012:

Troops of junior rank today have "few privileges and barely any freedom of movement to flee their perpetrators, to seek help when they need it most, or to leave the units or bases where they are being brutalized," said Anuradha K. Bhagwati, a former Marine Corps captain and executive director of the Service Women’s Action Network.

The defense at SSgt. LeBlanc's Article 32 hearing tried to steer the questioning towards the alleged victim. From Lackland trainer bragged of sex, witnesses say:

LeBlanc's civilian defense attorney, Joseph Jordan, tried to begin his questioning by asking her what kind of men she was attracted to, but the prosecution successfully objected. Later, he asked her what kind of panties she was wearing and whether she was aroused.

"Did it make you feel good?" he asked.

"It was uncomfortable," she replied. After leaving the supply room, she went straight to the bus stop, she testified, where, she said she felt "blank."

Jordan also asked about the term "rape."

"I never put that word to it," she said, until after she was questioned by investigators.

This defense strategy is not going to work. Asking whether "it" made the victim "feel good" is admitting implicity that "it" happened, and if "it" happened, then the MTI was at least a little out of bounds when he was expected to be well within bounds; the defense attorney here is implicitly admitting his client's guilt, and is merely trying to establish some kind of extenuation to soften the punishment.

At this point, none of the material that I have seen regarding the accusations against SSgt. LeBlanc or SSgt. Estacio suggests physical coercion or any kind of threat of physical force. However, this is not always the case in other alleged assaults.

In this excerpt, we consider the story of a female airman who was forcibly raped on a temporary duty assignment (TDY, in Air Force parlance) in 2010. From Overcoming sexual assault: A victim's candid story, dated April 13, 2012:

During a temporary duty at a stateside location, that 'friend' stripped her of her clothes, held her down and raped her, as she begged him and pleaded with "no, please stop, I don't want this!" the entire time, she said.

"(The alleged assailant) and I stayed on the same floor of our hotel," recalled Smith. "He came over to my room to watch a movie with me. I didn't see him as a threat and was friends with him at home station, so I didn't see a problem with watching a movie together.

"When he got to my room and started watching the movie, he started trying to touch me and asked if I wanted to (mess around sexually)," she said. "I told him, 'no.' He didn't take no for an answer, pinned me to the bed and stripped off my clothes, then ..."

Smith said she was then raped.

Smith, a 5-foot-tall, 93-pound female was easily pinned down and couldn't break free, she said.

After being raped, the assailant then tried to hug her, in a manner as if they had just made love consensually.

Another story is recounted in An Air Force War on Sexual Assault:

It was in 2006, after eight years in the US Air Force, that SSgt. Marti Ribeiro was raped by a fellow airman while on guard duty in Afghanistan.

She didn’t report the assault immediately. Rather, she waited until the end of her shift, and in the meantime, did what she thought she should do.

"I didn’t take a shower; I didn’t wash my hands," Ribeiro remembers. "I'd watched 'Law and Order' and thought to myself, 'I'm going to do exactly what [lead character] Detective Benson says, ... so they can swab and do the rape kit."

That's not what happened, however.

After her guard shift, Ribeiro searched for the Air Force's sexual assault response coordinator (SARC) at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, where the assault took place just 10 feet from the guard station, and not much farther from Disney Drive — the main road running through the heart of the base.

The SARC sat her down in the middle of a room with other people and asked her what happened. After Ribeiro finished sharing her story, "her first question was, 'Where was your weapon?' "— implying, it seemed to Ribeiro, she should have been able to defend herself. She had left it in the guard post, along with her radio, when she went to have a cigarette break on a smoke deck a few feet away.

"Because I'd left my weapon in the guard shack, she told me I would be charged with dereliction of duty," Ribeiro recalls. "She told me to 'think about it.' " Ribeiro did. She returned to her base housing, showered, and did not speak about the attack to another soul for six months.

Well, that last incident occurred in 2006, so it was presumably due to Bush and the Republican War on Women. But, what about the previously described incident, about the airman who was raped in 2010? And, the developing scandal at Lackland? And recent accusations against cadets at the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs?

If helping women is a priority for the Obama Administration, then why, after more than three years with Obama as Commander-in-Chief, have we seen no significant improvement in the rate of sexual assault in the armed forces, or at least in the way in which the problem is being addressed? It is not as if Obama has paid no attention to various personnel issues within the armed forces; after all, gays and lesbians got permission to serve openly. What has Obama done about rampant sexual assault in the military, mainly victimizing women?

By the way: in this post, we only looked at sexual assaults in the Air Force. What's the situation in the other branches?

Skipping down in An Air Force War on Sexual Assault:

As the Air Force publicly grapples with the problem of sexual assault within its ranks, [Charlene M.] Bradley [the Air Force's assistant deputy for force management integration] has found other services are coming to the Air Force for advice.

Convolutions, Part 1

How far down the rabbit hole must I go?

__________

The terms "left" and "right" are too imprecise. They imply a unidimensionality of the political spectrum, but this unidimensionality is a gross oversimplification. Reality is very multidimensional.

Other terms that have more use are "conservative" and "liberal", though their use today is dramatically different from what their use once was and from what their use truly should be.

Originally, "conservatives" wanted to conserve the power of the king; "liberals" sought to put power into the hands of the people, and this implicitly meant at royal expense.

Today, "conservatives" are more accurately those who seek to conserve what has traditionally made America great. Today's "liberals" generally seek to change these things that have made America great; in doing so, they wish to install in America the very systems that have caused other countries to be at best mediocre, at worst hell-on-earth.

Among the things that have made America great, and which liberals have sought so diligently to change, is the idea of limited government and government wherein the people are the masters. America was designed by those who had a real experience at the hands of out-of-control excessive government; America was designed to be a "liberal" country, in the old sense of the word, whereby government power was limited and was controlled by the people through representatives who were popularly elected, and upon whose power many constraints had been placed. What today's conservatives generally seek to conserve is a classic liberal government.

Rightly, though, "conservatism" is not so much a political agenda as it is an attitude toward political agendas; it is a "look-before-you-leap" approach toward political agendas, an approach whereby changes are made incrementally, with continuous assessment of what kind of an impact the changes have before implementing more. In contrast, in this context, "liberalism" means implementing the changes rapidly and drastically. The result of rapid, drastic changes can easily be a big mess which, of course, will require a fix comprised of more drastic changes which, of necessity, are rapidly implemented.

It should come, then, as no surprise that today's liberals, the "left", seek to implement big government programs to fix any perceived societal ill. Such programs, liberally implemented - rapidly, without adequate forethought and without adequate monitoring to see how they are working - result in cures that are worse than the diseases they were intended to treat, in turn causing a need for still more government programs to fix the problems caused by the first government programs.

Some illustrations of this dynamic are in order.

The education system is a perfect example. Initially, the goal was laudable: equal opportunity to education, which was a means for people to make a better life. Equal opportunity meant that it had to be essentially free; perhaps at very modest cost of some kind, but basically free, so the children of even the nation's poorest would have a chance to go to school and build a better life. Fast forward many decades: we spend thousands of dollars per student per year in the government-run school system; in fact, the nationwide per-student average is just over $10,000 per year. The result: students who are behind other industrialized countries in math and science, students who have difficulty reading and writing in English, students whose critical thinking skills are far from adequate; high school graduates unprepared for the workforce or college. The liberal solution: more money for the government-run education industry, and more time in school for our students.

Having our students in the government-run school system is the problem, and more of the problem is not the solution.

This is what they are trying to do to our healthcare system.

The same thinking is behind our government-run pension system.

Those who have astutely studied history understand: nothing is so devastatingly expensive as when the government is going to give you something "free".

Where in the Constitution does the federal government get the authority to be involved in funding education or healthcare or a pension program for nearly every American?

Constitutionally, such powers should be reserved to the states or to the people. Our nation's founders understood that the most important thing is liberty; King George was making the colonies into a prison, and the founding fathers understood that if people could be let out of that prison, they could take care of themselves. That logic applies beyond the federal government, referencing as well the power of the state governments.

Constitutionally, if governments beyond the local governments are to be involved in education, then it should be state governments, but not the federal government. However, the potential is there for the states to become too involved in local schools, as well.

A similar line of reasoning applies to healthcare, mandatory government pension programs for the general population, and so on. Of course, with the Fourteenth Amendment incorporating the Bill of Rights against infringement by the states and their political subdivisions, it should not be assumed that states can do whatever they want.

Rarely is government the solution; generally, government is the problem. The founders of this country understood that, and limited the powers of government. All over the world, people suffer under out-of-control government, and flock to the United States to get away from it, whether that out-of-control government is or has been comprised of Nazis, communists, or sharia-enforcing mullahs. Why would anyone want to recreate here in the US that which was Constitutionally prohibited here and which fails so miserably elsewhere?

People as Playthings, Part 1

First, an excellent five-part vid from PBS Frontline, a report of an investigation done in conjuction with ProPublica and McClatchy:

Watch The Anthrax Files on PBS. See more from FRONTLINE.

Watch The Anthrax Files on PBS. See more from FRONTLINE.

Watch The Anthrax Files on PBS. See more from FRONTLINE.

Watch The Anthrax Files on PBS. See more from FRONTLINE.

Watch The Anthrax Files on PBS. See more from FRONTLINE.

It seems to me the government failed to make its case against Army scientist Bruce E. Ivins. As I see it, it was established that Dr. Ivins was a little eccentric; he may have committed burglary of the sorority houses, and he may have stolen some young ladies' underwear. If this indeed happened, Dr. Ivins broke some laws, but in a college prank sort of way. This does not make him a terrorist or a mass-murderer. The government failed to establish conclusively an opportunity, and it sure failed to establish a motive.

Who had both motive and opportunity? Who could access American weapons-grade anthrax, and would have motive to spread it around?

Who would target not just random American people, but specifically certain elements in the media and certain US Senators?

It seems to me the idea was not to maximize casualties among the American people, but rather, to maximize publicity about the potential for casualties. Unlike hoaxes a few years previously, this time the perpetrator did indeed have high-grade anthrax, and wanted to make sure America knew that, but without inflicting actual mass casualties, and while trying to make it look like Al Qaeda may have been responsible.

Who had both motive and opportuntity to do this?