Among the Sons of Togarmah, Part 6

In Part 1, we had a general overview of the Caucasus, including considering the methods Moscow has historically used to pacify the region. In Part 2 we considered how Islamic terrorists were targeting the region of Kabardino-Balkaria, a region near Sochi; significant, because Sochi is an important Russian resort city and will be hosting the 2014 Winter Olympics in February, and Russia was hoping the influx of tourism to the region would help the economies not just of Sochi but of surrounding areas as well.

In Part 3 we took a long look at how Putin was pacifying Chechnya, mainly by supporting the clan of Razman Kadyrov. With Moscow's backing, Kadyrov's clan has provided a degree of stability and pacification of Chechnya, but at a cost: corruption which leads all the way to Moscow. Moscow funds, supplies and supports Kadyrov, and, in return, Kadyrov keeps Moscow from having to send troops to Chechnya for a third war (there have been two since the Soviet Union collapsed). However, the cost runs deeper: with government essentially an extension of Kadyrov who, in turn, delivers nearly unanimous support for Putin in federal elections, the people have nowhere to turn with grievances, except to Islamic extremists. There are Chechens who support Russia against the extremists, but who would rather not support the corruption of Kadyrov (or of Putin, for that matter). Meanwhile, Moscow has cultivated other clans in Chechnya which could replace Kadyrov - a sign of Putin hedging his bet.

In Part 4 we saw how the Islamic insurgency in the entire region basically cooperates with an eye to establishing a regional caliphate. The center of the regional insurgency seemed to be Dagestan. Then, in Part 5, we considered allegations that Putin and Kadyrov were involved in trafficking narcotics - something other regional actors also do, including the Islamic terrorists, who find heroin money useful to fund their jihad.

With the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics nearly upon us, it is perhaps time to update this series.

One issue that has been on the burner for years is economic development of the region. When I use the term "the region", I am referring to the Northern Caucasus, which is that part of the Caucasus in the Russian Federation. In fact, apart from the geographical Northern Caucasus, there is also the North Caucasus Economic Region, a geographical entity which includes fertile agricultural areas around the Kuban River, as well as the resort city of Sochi.

This region is distinct from the sovereign nations of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, which are sovereign nations that used to be republics in the former USSR. However, it is worth considering what is going on across the international borders from the Russian Federation's North Caucasus in these latter nations.

Regarding economic development of the North Caucasus, Russia has worked to improve the tourist industry in the area, as mentioned earlier in this series, especially with an eye to the 2014 Winter Olympics in Russia's tourist resort town of Sochi. However, as far back as 2011, plans were being devised to make the North Caucasus into a Russian version of Silicon Valley. From Silicon Valley planned for Russia's North Caucasus, August 25, 2011:

Plans have been put forward to create a Caucasian Silicon Valley, at a cost of 32 billion rubles ($1.1 billion) as part of on-going efforts to generate opportunities in the troubled Russian region.

[snip]

Silicon dreams

While the US Silicon Valley is a world leader in computing and IT advances, the Russian version will focus on making the raw materials.

In Stavropol Region factories will produce polycrystalline silicon, monocrystalline silicon is planned in Kabardino-Balkaria, multicrystalline silicon will come from Karachay-Cherkessia while North Ossetia will manufacture photovoltaic cells and Dagestan will work on solar modules, RIA Novosti reported.

The idea seems to come closer to Ramzan Kadyrov's stated commitment to make Chechnya financially independent by developing a manufacturing base.

As mentioned at the beginning of this post, Russia pays a price for peace in Chechnya, and Russians are tired of paying it. However, should the Caucasus become financially independent, then that dramatically diminishes the need for ties that local rulers such as Kadyrov have with Moscow.

Later that year, as Putin campaigned for the presidency in the March, 2012, election, he promised no cuts to the funding for economic development in the Caucasus - amid cries of "Stop Feeding the Caucasus", a slogan that was gaining popularity with Russians. From Putin says no cuts in North Caucasus funding, December 20, 2011:

A "Stop Feeding Caucasus" slogan is gaining popularity among Russians, stunned with images of new mosques and shiny buildings in the Chechen capital Grozny, destroyed in heavy fighting between the separatists and the Russian army in the 1990s.

The slogan was also picked up by some nationalist-minded opposition leaders like lawyer Alexei Navalny who is serving a 15-day jail sentence for disrupting public order during mass protests in Moscow after the Dec. 4 election.

Putin said that a reduction in investment would bring more migrants from North Caucasus into the large Russian cities "along with all the problems it causes" in a clear reference to last year's nationalist riots next to the Kremlin.

"What will we do then? Kick them all out? But where will they go? They will join the insurgency," Putin said, according to a transcript of the meeting posted on the government's website. "And the fratricidal war will carry on."

Skipping down:

Critics argue that money flowing into North Caucasus is stolen by corrupt officials. In his blog in March 2011 Navalny attacked an official from Dagestan who ordered a car worth $265,000 using public money, questioning why a minister of a poor region drive such an expensive vehicle.

[snip]

Official results showed Putin's United Russia party had received 99.5 percent of the vote in Chechnya, run by Putin loyalist Ramzan Kadyrov - a result which made the opposition cry foul. Other republics also backed United Russia.

Kadyrov, who hosted a glitzy opening ceremony for a skyscraper complex that was attended by Hollywood stars and coincided with his 35th birthday, said he was receiving money from Allah.

Promise economic development, then let the local pro-Moscow (pro-Putin) strongmen spend it to consolidate power?

An interesting and readable summary/overview is provided by Ariel Cohen, Ph. D., in an article entitled A Threat to the West: The Rise of Islamist Insurgency in the Northern Caucasus and Russia's Inadequate Response, from March 26, 2012:

Russia's Northern Caucasus is turning into one of the most volatile, lawless regions in the world and a hotbed for international terrorist activity in spite of decades of Russian military operations and repeated assurances from the Russian government that peace has been achieved. As Russia continues to lose control of the region, it is becoming a significant base for Islamist terrorist organizations and organized crime and may ignite an even greater terrorist campaign inside Russia and beyond.

[snip]

To alleviate the hostilities, the Russian government has implemented many economic and developmental programs and provided billions of dollars in aid to the North Caucasus in the past few years. Russian officials have invested to curb the appeal of radical Islam among the youth, but the area's overall economic and social prospects remain grim due to the ongoing security crisis caused by heavy-handed security policy and the pervasive corruption and mismanagement of the Russian government.

Thus, Russia's entire counterinsurgency strategy is in question. Its primary goal is "to make the local population less afraid of the law enforcement than the insurgents,"[2] but the overly violent Russian approach has often produced the polar opposite. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the North Caucasus has experienced two major wars and numerous skirmishes, resulting in hundreds of thousands of casualties and internally displaced persons, while the fear of terrorism has spread throughout Russia.

Spreading ungovernability in the Northern Caucasus facilitates the emergence of Islamist safe havens, complete with terrorist training facilities, religious indoctrination centers, and hubs of organized crime. This should be a cause for concern for the United States.

[snip]

U.S. policymakers should be concerned that the North Caucasus may devolve into an anarchic haven for Islamist terrorism and criminality. Security of America's friends and allies, prevention of a terrorist safe haven in the ungovernable North Caucasus, and ensuring the free flow of energy resources are high priorities for the U.S. in this volatile region. Such a threat should not be allowed to develop.

The interests of the United States and its allies could suffer from Russia's failure to respond appropriately to Islamist extremism. Washington needs to develop a strategy to respond to potential "spillover" from Islamist insurgency in the North Caucasus. The U.S. and its allies need to monitor the region for early signs of danger in order to respond appropriately. A modest investment in intelligence, diplomacy, and capacity-building with U.S. friends and allies could help to mitigate the rising Islamist threat and the effects of misguided Russian policies.

As explained in the article, spillover threatens important US allies, as well as important trade routes, especially energy trade routes, that skirt Russia's southern border through Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Well, fast-forward to 2013. The investment in the North Caucasus as a possible rival to Silicon Valley has begun. From New energy opportunities in Russia thanks to photovoltaics, May 23, 2013 (see original for links that I did not reproduce):

According to Tomasz Slusarz (CEO of Solar PV Consulting), Russia will consolidate its dominant position in the global energy market, above all, thanks to photovoltaic power.

Russia is one of the leading oil and gas producers and exporters in the world, but this has not stopped the government’s ambitions in the search for clean energy supplies. For this reason, and for some time, they have begun investing in alternative energy sources, including photovoltaics.

[snip]

The sun is certainly not lacking in Russia where there is a potential of about 1,870 TWh of radiation and an economic potential of 101 GWh per year. The sunniest regions are those in the south, particularly the Northern Caucasus...

[snip]

In fact, investments have been made by multi-billion dollar giants such as Renova and Lukoil both for the accomplishment of photovoltaic parks in order to encourage the creation of a national industrial sector.

A few weeks ago, they set the bases for the birth of a "Silicon Valley" in the Northern Caucasus, a joint venture between the local government and private companies to promote a project with the goal of producing polycrystalline silicon photovoltaic cells and modules.

Similarly, in Dagestan, a California-based company called Plug & Play has begun operations in the capital, helping develop businesses in the republic. From Plug & Play Tech Center opens in Dagestan, October 22, 2013:

Plug & Play, a Silicon Valley-based global business incubator, has opened a new affiliate center in Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan – a praiseworthy initiative in a region in Russia’s Northern Caucasus more often in the news for political conflicts and religious extremism than for IT innovations.

As East-West Digital News, the international resource on Russian digital industries, reported earlier this month, the Plug & Play Dagestan Center is located on the Dagestan State Technological University’s campus and plans to support 10-15 startups simultaneously. These projects receive a working space, mentors, legal advice, help with the search for funding, and the opportunity to present their projects to investors after six months.

[snip]

Plug & Play, which presents itself as “Silicon Valley in a Box”, claims that its incubated startups it has have raised more than $1 billion since 2006.

The question that comes to mind, though, is how much foreign investment and foreign tourism can the region expect, given the now-deteriorating security situation? From Failed North Caucasus Policy , July 22, 2013:

Events of the last few months have created the strong impression that something serious is brewing in the North Caucasus. Fighting in Chechnya has intensified, as has the conflict over its border with Ingushetia. Meanwhile, militants continue to kill policemen in Dagestan, and Chechen warlord Doku Umarov has threatened to detonate a bomb during the Winter Olympics in Sochi.

The problem is not that the Kremlin has recently committed a fatal mistake of some sort. Rather, we are witnessing the cumulative effect of a series of many small past mistakes resulting from the lack of a coherent strategy. Now, the authorities must deal with the consequences.

[snip]

Russia's withdrawal from the North Caucasus is effectively already underway in the form of a large-scale ­departure from the region of ethnic Russians. Meanwhile, several republics in the region no longer subject themselves to Russian legal or political norms, although formally they remain under Moscow's authority.

In Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan, Moscow rejected its usual approach of buying loyalty from the ethnic clan elites, attempting instead to achieve stability through the use of ­siloviki. But by relying on siloviki brought in from outside the region, Moscow's presence begins to resemble more of an occupying force. That model of rule is inherently unstable, and it is unclear just what price Moscow will end up paying for it in the near future. For example, it is clear that the dismantling of strongman and former Makhachkala mayor Said Amirov in Dagestan will sharply increase the risk of serious instability there.

Meanwhile, across the international borders, Armenia is working to become the Silicon Valley of the Caucasus. From Armenia can become Silicon Valley of the Caucasus, December 20, 2012:

On December 8, Armenian Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan met with the President of the California Institute of Technology Jean Lou Chameau, the Aysor.am reported.

According to the press service of the government, the Prime Minister presented the ongoing in the country education reform, as well as the process of international accreditation of Armenian universities. They discussed the prospects of bilateral cooperation and the development of information technology in Armenia.

The U.S. Congressman Adam Schiff, who attended the meeting, said that Armenia had the potential to become the Silicon Valley of the Caucasus.

(See also Armenia could become Silicon Valley of the Caucasus – Adam Schiff.)

Why indeed would foreign workers - whose expertise would be needed for anything more than just production of raw materials - and foreign capital be sent to Russia's North Caucasus, when across the international border (indeed, with a country in between) is the potential for greater development of true high-tech industry in a country that is safe from Islamic terrorism and free of the Moscow-backed corruption?

It will be interesting to see how the Winter Olympics go in Sochi, and what happens in other places, such as Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria.

Moscow Nights, Part 2

In Part 1 we took a cursory glance at select examples of corruption in Russia, finishing by calling attention to how Vladimir Putin talked about (over a decade ago) introducing the "dictatorship of the law" on Russia's lawlessness. We now further examine the situation in Russia.

We begin by considering an article from September 12, 2011, entitled We introduce to you a new vacation spot for government leaders... which, complete with pictures, documents a nice, new road leading off into nowhere - but which actually leads to a "tourist complex":

The official web page of the Republic of Altai Government says that, in 2009, Gazprom decided to build a tourist complex, Altai Inn, and that the complex would kick-start development of Altai's massive tourist potential. True, Gazprom people told us that the inn was intended for meetings with business partners, corporate events and for hosting foreign guests. So the tourist potential will obviously cater to a very narrow circle of people. Judging from the way we were pushed out of the inn, we were not members of that circle.

Rumours in Altai claim that the circle is, in fact, even narrower: indeed, guest and partner will be one and the same person, the number one person. We were immediately reminded of the unfortunate experience of journalists and archaeologists from the mountainous part of Altai who tried to attract public attention to the villa and the road. At their request, the Prosecutor's Office discovered some irregularities in the builders' operations and even fined the road contractor but, as a result, the initiators of the inspection had some trouble with the law.

We left the grounds ourselves, not waiting to be pushed out. Gazprom is apparently building the Altai Inn with its own money. The official customer is its subsidiary firm, Gazpromneft. The land, as we were told by the regional administration, had been bought from a deer-breeding farm that went bust and that it did not have the status of a nature reserve. The total cost of the complex is about 1.5 billion roubles. The company will decide how to use the tourist facility and it answered all our questions in the same way as the guards did: "This is private property".

But the road is not private property.

The documents in fact do not refer to it as a road but, rather coyly, as a "spur off highway M52”. The customer is the state-owned institution Gorno-Altai Avtodor, which means the republic's administration. We easily discovered the cost on the Internet: four billion roubles, ie, 200 million per kilometre. By comparison, the annual budget of the whole republic is nine billion. But it is not the locals who are paying: at the Prime Minister's special order, the "spur" leading to Gazprom's complex has been financed out of the Federal Budget, ie, with tax payers' money.

Skipping down just a bit:

[A local named Lev] told us that he was breeding and selling horses, that gays held jamborees on the bank of Katun every summer and finally told us the details of how the Prime Minister himself allegedly came to inspect the tourist complex: "We expected him to fly in by chopper but he drove by jeep."

At that point, one of us noted that the grass growing around the house was cannabis. Lev looked a bit embarrassed and said that the locals were not interested in the grass: "Even the locusts don't eat it here; it's only for those who come here every summer."

It seems federal money was used to build a road to a private country getaway (known in Russian as a "dacha") with a very exclusive guestlist: Vladimir Putin. And, by the way, those who accompany Putin may have an interest in smoking pot.

Why does Russia tolerate Putin?

All countries are unique, but Russia is more unique than most other countries. Russia is not European, yet Russia is not Asian. Russia is Russian - but, the definintion of that word "Russian" is what presents the challenge.

So, why does this place and its people tolerate Putin?

Some analysis from Why haven't the 2011 protests hit Russia? from November 21, 2011:

Russia is far from a brutal war or famine. In fact, it lacks many of the social and economic conditions plaguing Arab states and Western liberal democracies. Despite declining polls, Putin and Co. still remain popular. Russia has successfully weathered the global economic crisis, has no sovereign debt problem, no mortgage crisis, and no widespread household debt. According to Rosstat, overall unemployment is low, around six per cent, but joblessness among young people 16-25 years old is quite high, 26.1 per cent, and comparable to that in Arab states and the West.

Yet this has not caused many young people to lose faith in capitalism or the Putin system. "In Russia everyone knows the emperor wears no clothes, even when he's dressed in Armani and Brioni. Yet we don't have 'occupiers'", writes Malor Sturua in Moskovskii komsomolets. "The ideals of our youth are Putin and [the oligarch Roman] Abramovich, power and money. They aren't drawn to occupy Moscow's 'Wall Street'. They prefer to be a part of it."

Moreover, Sturua continues, Russia is "submerged in a pool of social passivity and civic apathy. Civil society has not ripened in it. Authoritarian society has ripened where they chose the Presidents and nominate the Prime Ministers several years before the elections in secret from the people. And the people who do this are a million times less than one per cent of the Russian population. 'Stability' plays the role of progress. And as they explain not long ago, the Brezhnev stagnation was damn good for the Soviet Union."

Now we consider excerpts from Integrating Russia’s Post-Imperium, by Dmitri Trenin, November 2, 2011:

With Russia's 2012 presidential elections effectively over since Vladimir Putin's decision to reclaim his old Kremlin office, it is time to turn from personalities to policies. Putin plans to stay in the Kremlin for two more presidential terms, another 12 years, as he is enabled to do by the recently-amended constitution. So who will be Russia's next president is now a certainty; less obvious is what he hopes to achieve.

One issue, however, has now shot to the top of Russia's political agenda: Eurasian integration. In early October, Putin wrote a newspaper article that proclaimed what appears to be his reigning foreign-policy goal: a Eurasian Union of former Soviet states. Two weeks later, in St. Petersburg, he hosted a meeting of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) prime ministers, eight of whom signed an agreement establishing a free-trade area among their countries. On January 1, 2012, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, which now form a customs union, will join a single economic space.

And Putin wants even more: a "Eurasian Schengen" (free movement of people among the three countries, built on the example of the European Union) by 2015, followed by a currency union and, ultimately, full economic integration. Indeed, Putin wants to restructure Russia's relations with the former Soviet states to create not merely a bigger market, but eventually an economic bloc-cum-security alliance.

[snip]

In his much-quoted newspaper piece, Putin denied that his new integration plans are aimed at restoring the Soviet Union under another name. This is a credible claim, for three basic reasons: the complete evaporation of Russia's imperial élan, its unwillingness to pay other countries' bills, and the new countries' unwillingness to cede too much sovereignty to the former hegemon.

[snip]

Putin is ambitious, but he is also cautious. He probably sees that only mutual economic interest can do the trick. Creating a new Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON, the Soviet-era trade bloc), or a new Warsaw Pact, is as impossible as a latter-day Soviet Union. Eurasian economic integration, if it stands a chance, must follow a different path.

If all parties concerned join voluntarily, and proceed in a step-by-step manner, as with the EU or the North American Free Trade Agreement, Eurasian integration will benefit all of those involved. Rather than behaving like an empire secretly trying to re-invent itself, Russia has an opportunity to become a regional leader. But Eurasian integration will fail if Russia's partners see the process as Moscow’s attempt at political domination.

[snip]

In the West, Putin's best-remembered statement about the Soviet Union described its end as the "greatest catastrophe of the twentieth century." But Putin's other comments, less familiar to Western readers, refer to the Soviet system as "unviable." In his ruthless judgment, those who want the USSR back "have no brains."

The picture that emerges is one of Putin presenting himself as a strong, perhaps paternalistic leader, not unlike some of Russia's tsars. A comparison to Stalin is not totally inappropriate, provided one also considers the contrasts. This strong leader guarantees strength and stability to Russia during times of global turmoil, and Russians, who have had three revolutions in the past century, and centuries of troubles at the hand of foreign and domestic powers, are not unattracted by this prospect. Yes, Putin is corrupt, but cynicism would dictate that all leaders are, and at least under Putin, Russians have stability and a chance to work their way into a better life and become "part of it".

Yet, Putin's plan is not to rebuild the USSR, which was founded on ideology and preached a world revolution; rather, Putin is about business, regardless of which side of the law the business is on. This is an economic empire being built - it is everything Soviet ideologues ever accused the United States in particular and capitalists in general of being.

But, instead of a phoenix arising from the ashes of the Soviet Union, Russia's corrupt leadership today is fiddling while Russia burns. From Russia's Dangerous Implosion, November 19, 2011:

Russia is set to experience a debilitating demographic crisis. Its population will sicken and drop by one-third, and its dominant Slavic-Orthodox population will dwindle and be surpassed by its Islamic faction. The consequences of this crisis will, unless the world gets better leadership than the likes of Barack Obama, and soon, have dire and direct and lasting effects for the rest of the world.

According to RIA Novosti, Russia's Kremlin-funded answer to Reuters, between 1950 and 2000 Russia's share of the world population fell by half, from 4% to 2%. And, according to RIA, it will fall by half again before this century is out, dropping to just 1%. That means only one out of every 100 people on the planet will be citizen of the Russian Federation.

If you look at a map of the world in 2100 with boundaries redrawn to reflect share of world population (RIA helpfully draws one for you), Russia is invisible. While the population of the rest of the world has grown, Russia's has fallen back to the level it had in 1950 under Stalin. By 2100, the population if the USA will be more than triple that of Russia.

If we start analyzing the causes of this catastrophe, we make initial note of the fact that Russia has the world's highest rate of abortion. In 2009 Russia exterminated a shocking 1.3 million fetuses, 73 for every 100 babies born. Russia has more abortions each year than the United States, a country with more than double Russia's population. By contrast, Russia's birth rate ranks #166 out of 195 world nations. Hardly any babies are being conceived, and more than 40% of those that are conceived are exterminated before being born.

The fate of babies that are born in Russia is a bleak one. Russia ranks #6 in the world for fatality by suicide. It has the second-highest prevalence of AIDS in Eurasia. It is #7 in the world for cigarette consumption and #5 in the world for alcohol consumption. Its rate of fatality by fire is ten times that of the United States, and it is the most dangerous place in the world to drive a car or get on a plane.

All this leads Russians to a very early grave: Russia's average life expectancy of 65.5 years places it #135 out of 194 world countries. That's the bottom third of the planet.

Russians have given up on the future, seeking desperately to have fun today, and perhaps a better tomorrow; that the day after is doomsday means nothing - or, perhaps, it means everything, and has become the justification.

For whatever reason, Mother Russia is dying.

From Russia: the logic of decline, September 16, 2011:

There are specific factors that precipitate the demise of a system. Above all, it is the ruling team that cannot be replaced. If there is no political competition, there can be no development. How important is it who personifies power? Judge for yourselves: Putin, who is associated with certainty (we know what to expect from him) may accelerate the processes of decay. For his part, Medvedev, with his diffuse position and penchant for mimicry, might slow them down. But what is better for Russia: rapid or slow decay? Putin's regime, relying on security structures and their control of property, is inherently repressive and incapable of modernisation.

Another factor of decline is the obsession of the power apparatus, above all security men, with their personal enrichment. All civilisations perished when their elites started thinking about their own purses. Sparta and the Ottoman Empire were invincible until the Spartans and the Janissaries engaged in trade.

[snip]

The "Kushchevskaya syndrome", which has been repeated many times all across Russia, i.e. the intertwining of the mob, business, government and repressive bodies, is further proof of degradation of a system that cannot function even according to its own rules.

[snip]

The Russian ruling class not only deprives society of its viability. It is setting a trap for itself. The most successful mechanism that humanity has developed for self-preservation (including of the elite) is free competition. As soon as the East European elites agreed that they would not cling to power, they guaranteed development for their societies and security for themselves. The fact that the Russian ruling team is trying to secure an infinite monopoly for itself attests to its lack of confidence and inability to run a free society. Monopoly implies the need constantly to protect it and it makes it impossible to relinquish power without fearing for one's life. So far, only Mikhail Gorbachev has managed to break out of this vicious circle without fearing for his personal safety. The fate of Arab rulers who have lost power or are desperately clinging on to it cannot but prompt anxious thoughts in Russian rulers. If they hope they will be able to avoid sharing the fate of other "autocrats" they are in for a disappointment: the last twenty years have not seen a single instance of a happy end to one-man rule.

[snip]

Everything is beginning to fall apart. The once all-powerful institution of leadership is losing its influence. There is a growing awareness in the midst of the political class that relying on Putin as guarantor of security may soon pose a threat to the very survival of that class. The state and its security structures are perceived by the population as a hostile force. When 73% of respondents believe that the gap between the rich and the poor has widened over the last ten years and 52% that the government has more thieves and corrupt officials than in the 1990s and finally, when more than half the respondents are sure that the coming elections will not be fair - that is a sign of alienation of the population from power.

Moscow is well-lit by power, money, and good times, but all around, dusk is falling on one of the world's great countries, as a great people, which has been through so much, parties its way into a long, dark night.

Moscow Nights, Part 1

Vladimir Putin's past is catching up with him.

From Vladimir Putin dogged by recent corruption scandals, March 15, 2011 (which I first found reprinted in Georgian Daily; I have reproduced links found in the original):

MOSCOW, Russia — That Russia is one of the most corrupt countries on earth has become a given.

Usually, that fact is illustrated by numbers: Transparency International ranks Russia near the bottom of its corruption perceptions index (at 154), well below any other Group of Eight nation and even below such winners as Egypt (98) and Libya (146).

Transparency International's 2010 report categorizes countries on a ten-point scale. Countries with scores above 9 are considered "very clean", while countries with scores below 1 would be considered "highly corrupt". The lowest score, 1.1, placed Somalia in 178th place. With a score of 2.1, Russia tied for 154th place. (By comparison, the United States, with a score of 7.1, tied with Belgium for 22nd place.)

Continuing with Vladimir Putin dogged by recent corruption scandals:

But in the past few weeks, two scandals have given an unexpected face — that of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin — to what the Russian leadership has termed the country's biggest problem.

The two scandals — one involving a secret villa and the other a sham charity concert — prove that corruption, having seeped into every aspect of Russian life, leaves no one untouchable.

News of what has become known as the "Putin Palace" first emerged in December, when businessman Sergei Kolesnikov wrote an open letter to President Dmitry Medvedev calling on him to investigate the powerful prime minister for alleged corruption.

"Corruption can only be eradicated if the effort commences at the top and goes all the way to the bottom," Kolesnikov wrote. His letter was an insider's tale that recounted the construction of a 3,000-square-foot mansion being built on the Black Sea which, he alleged, was to be used by Putin as a vacation home.

In response, the palace was quietly sold "to a little-known businessman named Alexander Ponomarenko."

Skipping down in Vladimir Putin dogged by recent corruption scandals:

Soon after the sale, a second scandal erupted, this time involving a charity concert in St. Petersburg, attended by Hollywood elite, ostensibly to raise funds to help children with cancer. It was at that fundraiser, organized by an unknown charity called Federation Fund, where Putin took to the stage to sing his now famous rendition of "Blueberry Hill."

This scandal also broke with an open letter, from the mother of one of the sick children who expected to receive help. "It's been three months since [the concert]," wrote Olga Kuznetsova, whose daughter received a highly publicized visit from Sharon Stone ahead of the event. "There's no money, no help, no fund even." A doctor at Hospital 31, where Kuznetsova's daughter is receiving treatment, confirmed to Russian media that it had gotten no money after the charity concert.

The fund — which has no public listing, no website — was allegedly registered just ahead of the event. Its head is Vladimir Kiselyov, a Soviet-era rock star and St. Petersburg native who is said to have been a classmate of Putin's.

Here I review a paragraph from page 6 of Globalization and Transnational Organized Crime: The Russian Mafia in Latin America and the Caribbean by Bruce Michael Bagley, dated November 15, 2002; I interrupt in mid-paragraph with my own comments:

Western donor nations generally and the United States specifically may have contributed indirectly to undermining or weakening the Russian state and others in Eastern and Central Europe in the 1990s through their misdirected aid policies. Fearing that Communist party bureaucratic holdovers might seize control of, or improperly divert, Western assistance flows into Russia and other former Soviet bloc countries, whenever possible most international donors channeled their assistance through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) rather than through existing state institutions. The intent was to help strengthen the region's embryonic civil societies in the post-Soviet period while undercutting entrenched and corrupt bureaucratic authorities.

Was it? Was that the intent - to strengthen the newly-free society?

Continuing with the paragraph from page 6 of Globalization and Transnational Organized Crime: The Russian Mafia in Latin America and the Caribbean:

Good intentions notwithstanding, such policies, in practice, did not prevent Western aid resources from being siphoned off by the region's proliferating organized crime groups and may even have facilitated criminal enterprises of various sorts by circumventing state controls altogether. Simultaneously, such aid practices unquestionably further reduced the authority and impact of already debilitated state institutions while limiting international donors' leverage in support of effective institutional reforms.¹⁵

Or, did people in western governments use that intent as cover to organize crime in Russia along lines that might be conducive to their own interests? Perhaps to get Russia down and kick her, so there would be no one to contest the power of a triumphant America? Or, perhaps making things conducive to the business of the organized crime faction that had those western officials on its payroll?

Skipping down:

The U.S. government's interagency working group on international crime observes that over the latter 1990s the traditional domination of the "thieves-in-law" or "godfathers" of Russian crime gradually began to yield to a new breed of more "...flamboyant, aggressive and politically savvy ..." Russian criminals "...well-versed in modern technology and business practices that allow them to operate efficiently across international borders."¹⁸ Perhaps the most powerful of this new breed of Russian crime syndicates in terms of wealth, influence and financial control is the Solntsevo group known as Solntsevskaya. Solntsevskaya dominates Moscow's criminal underworld – including the drug market – and is reputed to have extensive worldwide operations involving arms and narcotics trafficking and money laundering operations.¹⁹ These overseas contacts and alliances do not, however, signal the emergence of a vast, centrally directed Russian underworld empire. Rather most Russian international criminal networks appear to be made up of "alliances of convenience" that are temporary and impermanent, not long-term and strategic.²⁰

Temporary, not long-term... has that changed? Anyway, does it matter? Mafioso-temp agencies; work a deal to get the specific results you want, without having unnecessary criminals on your organization's payroll...

Continuing (I fixed a typo):

With the transition from the presidency of Boris Yeltsin to that of Vladimir Putin in 1999-2000, the political pendulum in Russia may have begun to swing back toward the construction of a stronger Russian state, one perhaps more authoritarian than democratic.²¹ Public opinion in Russia has exhibited overwhelming concern in recent years with the construction of a "strong state" capable of reining in rampant lawlessness and corruption. Putin himself has repeatedly referred to the need for imposing "the dictatorship of law". Skeptical observers, however, note that President Putin himself is the product of the very oligarchical system created under Yeltsin and that he has publicly rejected the popular idea of investigating the results of Russia's highly questionable privatizations of former state-owned enterprises during the 1990s for legal improprieties, cronyism and corruption. If, as Margaret Beare emphasizes, "...the meaning of the 'dictatorship of law' should turn out to be protection of the gains of the beneficiaries of the legal vacuum, then the main sources of Russian organized crime and corruption are likely to remain unaffected."²²

So, Putin wanted to force lawfulness on Russia, but then, as President, and now as Prime Minister, he has consolidated his power and the power of the criminal factions he represents.

Now, there is change we can believe in!

The South Country, Part 2

In Part 1, we introduced the new rioting occurring in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan.

Here we take a look behind the headlines to see what is really going on.

At the end of the first post, I pointed out that the unrest was supposedly sparked by rival gangs.

Well, we now consider Kyrgyz South and Uzbek issue, dated June 9, 2010, by Sanobar Shermatova. The English is a little hard to decipher, since it is not the author's native language, so instead of quotes, I summarize.

Aibek Mirsidikov, known as "Black Aibek", was reputedly an organized crime boss. Government authorities recently announced that organized crime factions were becoming more active in southern Kyrgyzstan (which borders neighboring Uzbekistan in the Ferghana Valley, near the city of Osh); it appeared a mob war was breaking out.

When Black Aibek was murdered, the governor of Jalal-abad Oblast (the province north of Osh Province, where the city of Osh is located, and where the recent unrest has been occurring), Bektur Asanov, blamed the death on the mob war.

In Kyrgyzstan, the business and criminal worlds are closely linked, and organized crime provides important "services" to political factions in return for certain payments. Once the services are rendered, if the payment is not made on time, trouble ensues. A classic example of this was when the organized crime boss Ryspek Akmatbaev threatened to bombard the Kyrgyz White House if the previous president, Kurmanbek Bakiev (run out of Kyrgyzstan during violence this past April), did not pay what he owed to the underworld. It was scandalous as the people of Kyrgyzstan saw their president negotiating with a crime boss.

Black Aibek was an Uzbek. Another Uzbek, Kadyrzhan Batyrov, who is reputed to be a legitimate businessman with significant political clout, emerged as another popular leader in the community. Supposedly, Batyrov was losing power under exiled President Bakiev's regime, which was more closely tied to illegal business activities; when Bakiev left recently, Roza Otunbayeva became the interim president, and the situation began to reverse. So, in retaliation, Black Aibek blamed Batyrov for burning the houses of the ex-president and his relatives; these allegations of Kyrgyz suffering violence at the hands of Uzbeks had the anticipated incendiary effect, igniting the most recent round of ethnic violence.

The unrest that resulted in Bakiev's departure and Otunbayeva's accession to the interim presidency has, of course, been blamed on Russian intelligence and the CIA, depending upon who you listen to.

An excellent article by STRATFOR blames it on Moscow, with excellent analysis of the rationale that would lead to the Kremlin's involvement. I present here only an excerpt, and very highly recommend that you read the article, Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Resurgence, in its entirety.

Central Asia largely comprises a massive steppe of more than a million square miles, making the region easy to invade. The one major geographic feature other than the steppe are the Tien Shan mountains, a range that divides Central Asia from South Asia and China. Nestled within these mountains is the Fergana Valley, home to most of Central Asia's population due to its arable land and the protection afforded by the mountains. The Fergana Valley is the core of Central Asia.

To prevent this core from consolidating into the power center of the region, the Soviets sliced up the Fergana Valley between three countries. Uzbekistan holds the valley floor, Tajikistan the entrance to the valley and Kyrgyzstan the highlands surrounding the valley. Kyrgyzstan lacks the economically valuable parts of the valley, but it does benefit from encircling it. Control of Kyrgyzstan equals control of the valley, and hence of Central Asia's core.

Moreover, the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek is only 120 miles from Kazakhstan's largest city (and historic and economic capital), Almaty. The Kyrgyz location in the Tien Shan also gives Kyrgyzstan the ability to monitor Chinese moves in the region. And its highlands also overlook China's Tarim Basin, part of the contentious Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.

Given its strategic location, control of Kyrgyzstan offers the ability to pressure Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China. Kyrgyzstan is thus a critical piece in Russia's overall plan to resurge into its former Soviet sphere.

If it is true that Russia saw Kyrgyzstan getting too close to the West under Bakiev, and if it's true that Otunbayeva is Moscow's woman in Bishkek, then allegations that Washington is behind the current unrest might make sense. The violence is allegely "clearly directed"; from Azimbek Beknazarov: Unrest in the south of Kyrgyzstan has well defined interethnic character and is clearly directed, dated June 11, 2010:

"The unrest in the 'south capital' of Kyrgyzstan has well defined interethnic character and is clearly directed", stated the Deputy Interim Leader, Curator of force structure Azimbek Beknazarov, who is in Osh city at the moment.

However, don't for a moment think that it ends with factionalism and strategic geopolitical considerations; Kyrgyzstan is just one of the many places where control of the world's heroin industry is being decided; but, more on that later.

For now, I suggest the following links for further information, though I do not necessarily endorse the information or conclusions to be found there:

CIA PUT ROZA INTO POWER? OIL, HEROIN, AIR BASES AND BANKERS IN KYRGYZSTAN

CIA SEEKS CHAOS IN KYRGYZSTAN?

more unrest in Kyrgystan follows hot on the heels of NATO visitor

Triplethought, Part 1

George Orwell explained to us his prophetic vision of humanity's future:

If you want a vision of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face - forever.

The musician Leonard Cohen comments about the future, in his song by the same title:

I've seen the future, brother: it is murder.

__________

The Russian Federation is implementing new regulations requiring Internet service providers (ISPs) to keep information on their clients. We begin with Russian ISPs have no fears over new rules by Evgeniya Chaykovskaya, April 16, 2010.

Russia's Ministry of Communications insists that an order for Internet providers to log IP addresses and share them with the authorities is not a clamp-down on net freedom - because it's been going on for ages.

But a federal ban on hosting "extremist" sites already seems to be counter-productive, according to many experts.

Those two comments sum up government programs that are designed to "help" society: they formalize infringements on our liberty while facilitating the very activities they are supposed to protect us against.

Think about that.

And the ruling was received calmly, with 80 per cent of ISPs already doing this, according to Andrei Vorobyov of RU-CENTER's PR department.

"The logic of our business makes us take part in the fight against cybercrime - companies are objectively interested in it. Large companies have been registering clients' IP addresses for a long time. Now those who neglected it will have to register - for example small 'last-mile' providers," Leonid Filatov, CEO of Masterhost hosting company told iToday.

First of all, they are already keeping records of Internet use, and have been for years. And notice, they are doing this in the public interest - who can argue with that? :)

But Andrei Kolesnikov, the Director of Coordination Center for TLD .RU, is certain that fixing IP addresses will not eliminate the problem of the search for cybercriminals: "Those who want to commit a crime on the Internet can take measures to make sure that they are not found afterwards."

Meanwhile Kommersant was unimpressed with a the federal Communications Monitoring Service's efforts to block extremist sites.

Reports cited one Chechen rebel site which attracted a mere handful of visitors until the ban was announced - and the subsequent publicity boosted its traffic as the restrictions were technically difficult to implement.

Nothing like forbidding the fruit to get people to taste it, huh?

Of course, what does one expect from Russia? They have always had an absolutist government, not responsible to the people. Individual liberty, privacy - not factors.

Not a problem in America, right? This could never happen here. We are safe. We live in a free country. We can go back to sleep.

From Your ISP as Net watchdog, by Declan McCullagh, June 16, 2005:

The U.S. Department of Justice is quietly shopping around the explosive idea of requiring Internet service providers to retain records of their customers' online activities.

Data retention rules could permit police to obtain records of e-mail chatter, Web browsing or chat-room activity months after Internet providers ordinarily would have deleted the logs--that is, if logs were ever kept in the first place. No U.S. law currently mandates that such logs be kept.

In theory, at least, data retention could permit successful criminal and terrorism prosecutions that otherwise would have failed because of insufficient evidence. But privacy worries and questions about the practicality of assembling massive databases of customer behavior have caused a similar proposal to stall in Europe and could engender stiff opposition domestically.

Whatever it is they are going to claim they want to protect us from, understand that sorting through massive databases will diminish their ability to protect us from it. Investigators will go after innocent people who have done something that looks suspicious, and this will mean fewer critical resources are allocated to investigate people who really are doing something that needs to be investigated.

This is how government bureaucracy works.

What is it they want to protect us from? Skipping down in the article:

Justice Department officials endorsed the concept at a private meeting with Internet service providers and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, according to interviews with multiple people who were present. The meeting took place on April 27 at the Holiday Inn Select in Alexandria, Va.

"It was raised not once but several times in the meeting, very emphatically," said Dave McClure, president of the U.S. Internet Industry Association, which represents small to midsize companies. "We were told, 'You're going to have to start thinking about data retention if you don't want people to think you're soft on child porn.'"

Protect children from exploitation? Help missing and exploited children? Crack down on child pornography? Who can argue with that?

And, remember, if you're not with the government in the fight against child pornography, then you're with the pornographers.

Most of the comments to the article call attention to the threat posed here by government. One comment nails it:

The Justice Department, FBI, CIA, and NSA all report to the Executive Branch. We have seen over the years, starting with Nixon and Watergate to Clinton and Filegate (remember that one -- FBI files that mysteriously appeared in the White House), that there are few real protections and NO OVERSIGHT as to what goes on behind White House closed doors. Having access to individuals' web and email activity will provide a boon to corrupt administrations that want to compile dirt on their opposition and wage character assasination. This is the real danger -- that the opposition will effectively be neutralized. The govenerance of the country then basically becomes a dictatorship.

Filegate - first there were a hundred or so files. When caught, the Clinton Administration explained that it was no big deal, there were actually about 300. Then, when America was a little more upset, the number jumped to 500, 700, 900. The Clinton Administration taught us that little crimes upset the American people, but when you excuse yourself by explaining the crime was bigger than we had thought, then it's okay.

As the crimes get bigger, then it's okay....

Stay tuned for Part 2.