Pearls of the Sun God, Part 2

We continue from Part 1 examining the events in Somalia, which have taken an interesting turn.

Anyone following the news from the Horn of Africa knows that the TFG, together with AMISOM, launched an offensive to clear Al Shabaab terrorists from Mogadishu and its environs.

From AMISOM PRESS RELEASE: TFG/AMISOM Commence Operations to Secure Final Sector of Mogadishu, October 10, 2011:

10 civilian deaths from continued Al Shabaab mortaring in Heliwa and Karaan Districts last week have prompted the Somali National Army, supported by AMISOM, to undertake operations in the North of the Mogadishu.

Operations are aimed at securing the former Arafat Hospital and the Pasta Factory on the Industrial Road, and driving the Al Qaeda linked extremists out of the city.

And, more recently, from AMISOM PRESS RELEASE: Control of Deynile Critical to Security of Mogadishu, October 21, 2011:

Mogadishu, 21 October, 2011; AMISOM Force Commander, Maj. Gen. Fred Mugisha, today undertook a tour of the frontline following the commencement yesterday of operations in support of the Somali National Army, aimed at pushing al-Qa'ida linked extremists from the strategic Deynile district on the outskirts of Mogadishu.

"Deynile is of vital strategic importance as it controls access to the Afgoye Corridor which links the capital to the terrorist-controlled areas of southern Somalia, allowing them to reinforce and resupply their fighters in Masla and Balaad in the far northeastern edges of the city," he said following his tour.

"The Afgoye Corridor is also home to hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons and securing it will allow humanitarian aid, which the extremists have so far been restricting, to finally reach them," he said. "The extremists have also been using the suburbs of Deynile as a base to assemble improvised explosive devices, including car and truck bombs such as those recently employed to target civilians in the capital."

He said that the success of this operation was critical for the security of Mogadishu. "As was to be expected, given Deynile's significance, the operation has encountered heavy resistance but steady progress is being made. In the face of this resistance, AMISOM has suffered casualties," he added.

The offensive has had some success - which generates new problems. As we previously pointed out, control of key economic areas in Mogadishu served as a source of income for Al Shabaab, as the organization "taxed" merchants and businesses.

Of course, we have also been told a big part of the problem in Somalia now is a famine.

But, then, the famine is starting to look a little suspicious.

We now consider an article entitled Somalia: Manufacturing a famine by Rasna Warah, October 19, 2011:

On July 18 this year, the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea tabled a report to the UN Security Council.

The report stated that United Nations agencies, international humanitarian aid organisations and local Somali non-governmental organisations had been forced to move their operations or cease them entirely in many parts of Somalia, mainly due to "an alarming void in international humanitarian aid and development assistance," and also because of "threats from elements of Al Shabaab," who control much of southern Somalia.

Two days later, the UN's World Food Programme — the largest distributor of food aid to Somalia — declared that Bakool and Lower Shebelle, two regions in southern Somalia, had been hit by the worst famine in 20 years.

The UN agency further claimed that 3.7 million people across the country — almost half the total Somali population – were in danger of starving, of which 2.8 million were in the south.

This declaration led to a massive multimillion-dollar fund-raising campaign by UN and international humanitarian agencies. Meanwhile, journalists began referring to the famine as a "biblical event." By September, Time magazine was reporting that the famine had expanded and that a full 12.4 million people in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda were at risk from hunger.

The magazine also stated that in southern Somalia, 63 per cent of the population was either starving or at risk of it.

These figures did not convince many Somali analysts, including Ahmed Jama, a Nairobi-based agricultural economist and former consultant with the UN's Food and Agricultural Organisation.

"I was disturbed by the WFP announcement because Lower Shebelle is Somalia's breadbasket and had even experienced a bumper harvest last year," he told this writer.

Skipping down:

But was there really widespread famine, or were the famine figures exaggerated or misinterpreted? FSNAU's estimates for Somali populations "in crisis" in the period August-September 2011 were highest in the most fertile southern parts of Somalia, and were highest in those areas controlled by Al Shabaab.

Significantly, there were only 490,000 people (less than one-eighth of Nairobi's population) in Somalia who were experiencing what the IPC classifies as "famine" or a "humanitarian catastrophe."

In fact, about half of the nearly four million people that the WFP claims are starving are actually experiencing what is known as a "humanitarian emergency"; the rest are in an "acute food and livelihood crisis."

Therefore, I think the widely reported "famine" in Somalia is highly exaggerated. What Somalia is experiencing is generalised food insecurity, not widespread famine. Unfortunately, most media organisations have failed to mention or comprehend this fact.

Is it possible that the "famine" in Somalia was "manufactured" to raise funds? The sequence of events leading to the famine appeal certainly raises suspicions. According to Jama, the timing of the famine declaration in July was probably a response to the shortfall of funds that WFP has recently been experiencing and also to divert attention from the criticism that the UN agency was subjected to after the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia released its 2010 report in March last year.

Then, WFP was castigated by the UN Monitoring Group for colluding with corrupt Somali contractors who are known to sell or divert food aid. Sources interviewed by the Monitoring Group — an entity mandated by the UN Security Council to monitor arms embargo violations in Somalia — estimated that up to half of the food aid reaching Somalia was regularly diverted, not just by Somali transport contractors, but by WFP personnel and NGOs operating in Somalia. That 2010 report led some donors, notably the US, to withdraw funding to WFP’s operations in Somalia.

Rasna then goes on to explain how the European Union has invested a considerable amount of money - 175 million Euros over the past 15 years - to develop the agricultural infrastructure of the Shabelle region of Somalia - "Somalia's breadbasket" - and the question presents itself as to how a famine could occur in a "breadbasket" whose infrastructure has been built up with so much investment over more than a decade. Later on, Rasna points out that the EU funds this through the UN, and relies on UN reports to assess the effectiveness of the program - without any independent or EU audits.

An opportunity for someone? To divert and profit from control of international aid? And, perhaps more... after all, there is international traffic of ships, aircraft, and trucks moving that international aid, from developed countries to Somalia, and then the ships, aircraft and trucks go back... I wonder if they are empty when they go back.

The interesting turn, though, is a Kenyan armed invervention, prompted - supposedly - by lawlessness that spilled over from Somalia into Kenya.

From Kibaki gambles on regional war with Al Shabaab, October 21, 2011 (also available here):

Panic in Lamu

Some witnesses say the kidnappings along Kenya's coast were carried out by groups linked to the Somali pirates whose operations have come under pressure from heavier international maritime policing in the region. The kidnappings generated panic. The resort town of Lamu, favoured by (relatively) wealthy European tourists, emptied within days and this at the start of the tourist high season, which this year was forecast to generate a record US$1 billion in revenue.

Those abductions were further aggravated by the kidnapping of two Spanish aid workers in the sprawling Dadaab refugee camp. This was the shot that sent Kenya's armed forces into south-central Somalia. Invoking Article 61 of the United Nations charter on territorial integrity, some 1,600 Kenyan troops launched their first cross-border military offensive, Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Nation), since the end of the Shifta War in 1967. Derided in the region for their lack of fighting experience, the Kenyan armed forces have deployed mechanised infantry with aerial cover from fighter aircraft and helicopter gunships. We hear that Somali TFG troops will be joining them in the battle for Afmadow.

The real prize, though, is the port city of Kismayo. Both Kenya's military and its Amisom counterparts believe that the capture of Kismayo, from which Al Shabaab now derives much of its revenue, will choke off the militants.

Kismayo... in Part 1 we discussed how Al Shabaab taxes, among other things, the charcoal industry, which exports charcoal to the Arabian Peninsula. But, a port town is important for moving other commodities, as well.

By the way: the Kenyan attack seems to be supported by US drone activity which has resulted in losses of some of our drones.

Either way, Kismayo is important to Al Shabaab, and Al Shabaab is preparing to defend it. From Kenya-Somalia: A risky intervention, October 20, 2011:

On the move

"Many people have been leaving in the last three days. No-one wants to get caught up in the fighting, I have sent my family to the villages," said a resident of Afmadow, a town 140km north of Kenya's border.

Describing the intervention as a "joint Kenya-Somali operation", the commander of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces in the border area, Gen. Yusuf Hussein Dhumal, told IRIN from his base in Tabta, 65km north of the Kenyan border, that his forces were in control of Qoqani, 50km south of Afmadow town.

"We are being delayed by heavy rains. Our aim was to be in Afmadow by now but the rains have made that impossible. We will push until we chase them [Al-Shabab] from Kismayo."

Mohamed Ahmed Ilkase, a reporter for Somali national TV travelling with the Somali forces, told IRIN Al-Shabab was reportedly regrouping in Afmadow.

A resident of the port city of Kismayo, 500km south of the Somali capital, Mogadishu, said Al-Shabab had been reinforcing its positions in the city and conscripting people "to fight the enemy. They have been bringing many militias since Monday [17 October] and have been calling on residents to register to fight."

He said families had started leaving the city. "Some are going south [towards Kenya], while many others are going north to Mogadishu."

Al Shabaab has time to dig in to defend Kismayo, conscripting local people to fight. The time is available because heavy rains are slowing the movement of the military forces trying to seize the town... heavy rains in a region that has a famine caused by drought.

Of course, it is not uncommon for an area devastated by drought to have heavy rain, which still does not make up for an extended time of below-average rainfall. And, it is not uncommon in arid regions of the world for sudden heavy rain to bring vehicular movement to a standstill.

We consider an excerpt from an article entitled Taliban Heroin Flooding Kenya on its Way To Europe and The Americas from December 14, 2009 (the post appears to be a copy of an article from The Standard (Kenya), to which I link in the sidebar, but I have (curiously) not been able to find the article there; italics, boldface and other formatting are in the original):

Kenya is fast becoming a key hub for trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan to the rest of the world.

According to reports by the United Nations, "30 to 35 metric tonnes" of Afghan heroin pass through East Africa each year.

This is two-thirds the volume going through West Africa. The largest ever drug haul in Kenya, in December 2004, was 1.1 metric tonnes with a street value of over Sh13 billion.

The proceeds from the drugs are used to finance terrorism activities in Northern Africa and some other sub-Saharan states. It is also suspected that the illicit drug trade supports the unending conflict in neighbouring Somalia.

The Taliban, among whom the world's most notorious terrorist Osama bin Laden hides, are reported to earn $100 million (Sh8 billion) a year from protecting the drug trade. Drug barons are rumoured to sit in Afghan government positions raking in billions more. The UN puts the potential export value of Afghan narcotics at about $3.4 billion (Sh270 billion) a year. So much is grown that destroying it all is impossible: With stockpiles of 10,000 metric tonnes awaiting export, the UN this year proposed creating a "flood of drugs" in the country to destroy the value of opium.

This last comment is interesting; if the Afghan opium fields were suddendly destroyed, for example, by spraying herbicide on or by burning the opium plants, there is still enough Afghan heroin in the "pipeline" to supply the world until another harvest - and, perhaps, for longer. This stuff has been getting stockpiled under the watch of US-led international forces in Afghanistan.

Skipping down:

On November 24, a ministerial declaration supporting UN efforts against drugs and organised crime was signed in Kenya. Dated December 8, the report quotes Antonio Maria Costa, the Executive Director on the UN Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) as saying: "Drugs are enriching not only organized crime but also terrorists and other anti-Government forces,"

He describes the situation as a worrisome development.

"In East Africa... 30 to 35 tonnes of Afghan heroin [are] trafficked each year causing a dramatic increase in heroin addiction and spreading of HIV and Aids in the slums of Nairobi and Mombasa."

The official said the rise is also connected to state failure in Somalia.

"Mainly because of the drastic situation in Somalia, he said, East Africa was becoming a free economic zone for all sorts of trafficking — drugs, migrants, guns, hazardous wastes and natural resources."

West Africa has traditionally been associated with the international drug trade but Kenya now leads states in East Africa that have emerged as favourites for drug traffickers.

Obviously, this development of Kenya becoming a hub for drug-trafficking is not something that happened over night. For example, drug-trafficking through Kenya was addressed in an article entitled Traffickers' drugs haven in Kenya by Karen Allen, May 9, 2006

Mules

It is something that worries Titus Naikuni, chief executive of Kenya Airways.

His airline crews have been amongst those used as drug mules.

Five of his staff have been arrested over the past year, trying to bring narcotics into Europe.

With extra security measures now in place, he says his employees are aware that international drug cartels are now targeting them.

The travel industry is used to move drugs from Kenya to Europe.

It is interesting that the previously-described "panic in Lamu" is resulting in a dramatically-decreased number of tourists coming in from Europe to Kenya. Decreased business might have an impact on the travel industry... at a minimum, fewer tourists means that honest customs and immigration officials (assuming some can be found) have more time to examine aircraft, passengers and cargo, and thus to detect drug shipments.

We now consider an excerpt from a recent report, Termites at Work: Transnational Organized Crime and State Erosion in Kenya by Peter Gastrow, September, 2011:

While to the onlooker Kenya appears to be in a relatively healthy state, it is in fact weakening due to a process of internal decay. Endemic corruption and powerful transnational criminal networks are “white-anting” state institutions and public confidence in them. Termites are at work, hollowing out state institutions from the inside. As a result, development is being hampered, governance undermined, public trust in institutions destroyed, and international confidence in Kenya’s future constantly tested.

The country is perceived as one of the most corrupt in the world, ranked far down at 154th on a list of 178 countries that feature in the 2010 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index.⁵ Close to 90 percent of Kenyans surveyed rated their country as being between corrupt and extremely corrupt, while only 8.5 percent regarded it as slightly corrupt.⁶ Bribery has become a normal part of life. In 2010, 58.6 percent of persons who sought the services of the Nairobi City Council paid bribes, 54.4 percent of those who sought the services of the police did the same, and 47.8 percent who sought the services of the judiciary also resorted to bribes.⁷ It is this corruption- ridden environment that enables criminal networks to thrive. They can buy protection, information, and power.

I wonder if the corruption includes collaborating with transnational cartels that traffic in Afghan heroin (and Latin American cocaine)?

Kenya's intervention in Somalia is not about stabilizing Somalia, a neighbor which has been in chaos for decades. The intervention is about control of a route for moving heroin from Afghanistan where it is produced, via Iran and Pakistan, to the Somali port of Kismayo, from which heroin is trafficked through the lawless areas of southern Somalia and across the border into Kenya, and from there smuggled to lucrative markets in Europe and elsewhere.

And, the US is actively supporting this intervention, just like the US occupies Afghanistan, where the heroin is now comfortably produced and even stockpiled.

Pearls of the Sun God, Part 1

We begin a new series looking at the situation in Somalia.

In addition to the civil war, which has been going on for two decades now, the situation in Somalia is once again complicated by drought which threatens many Somalis with starvation.

We begin with excerpts from Somalia famine: UN warns of 750,000 deaths, from September 5, 2011:

As many as 750,000 people could die as Somalia's drought worsens in the coming months, the UN has warned, declaring a famine in a new area.

The UN says tens of thousands of people have died after what is said to be East Africa's worst drought for 60 years.

Bay becomes the sixth area to be officially declared a famine zone - mostly in parts of southern Somalia controlled by the Islamist al-Shabab.

Some 12 million people across the region need food aid, the UN says.

The situation in the Bay region was worse than anything previously recorded, said senior UN's technical adviser Grainne Moloney.

"The rate of malnutrition [among children] in Bay region is 58%. This is a record rate of acute malnutrition," she told journalists in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi.

This is almost double the rate at which a famine is declared.

"In total, 4 million people are in crisis in Somalia, with 750,000 people at risk of death in the coming four months in the absence of adequate response," the UN's Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) says.

Bay is in southern Somalia, part of a region that is controlled by the Al Shabaab Islamist militants that are affiliated with Al Qaeda. Its capital, Baidoa, was the national capital for a short time during the 2000's. Al Shabaab is battling the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which is the internationally-recognized national government of Somalia, for control of this and other regions of Somalia.

The drought is, of course, a problem in much of East Africa, but its impact on Somalia, especially that part of Somalia controlled by Al Shabaab, is worse, because of insecurity and the attitudes of the militants.

Skipping down:

Unni Karunakara, head of medical charity Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), says al-Shabab's restrictions on aid workers mean many people in Somalia cannot be helped - and says aid agencies should be more open about this when appealing for more money.

"The grim reality of Somalia today is we are not able to get to south and central Somalia, which we consider to be the epicentre of the crisis," he told the BBC World Service.

"What is needed is a better representation of the challenges that aid agencies, including MSF, face in delivering assistance in Somalia today.

"Even if we are able to get food and supplies to the main ports of Somalia, I think there is a real challenge in being able to deliver that assistance - what I call the 'last-mile' problem."

Some officials from al-Shabab, which has links to al-Qaeda, have accused Western aid groups of exaggerating the scale of the crisis for political reasons.

Somalia's TFG is having problems with Al Shabaab even in the nation's capital. We review Somalia: Govt forces clash with armed militias in Mogadishu dateed September 3, 2011 (I have made some minor edits, in [brackets], though it is still a little rough; importantly, however, we appreciate the efforts of the journalists to bring this information to a much wider audience by writing in English):

MOGADISHU (Sh. M. Network) – The forces of Somali interim federal government forces clashed [with] armed militias dressed in government military uniform[s] who have checkpoints in the war weary Mogadishu by taking illegal money from public buses.

The government forces including police and military on Saturday morning launched a security crackdown in parts of the capital in a bid to clear out all checkpoints manned [by] armed militiamen.

Local residents said heavy firefight[s] rocked parts of Wadajir district southwest of the Somali capital.

They said the two parts used both heavy and light weapons during the armed confrontation.

But, after hours of taking over the checkpoints, Somali soldiers came under counter attack from the militias, erupting fierce fighting there.

However, there have been casualties but not known so far the number of dead people and injuries.

Meanwhile, the district commissioner of Mogadishu's Wadajir told Shabelle that government forces attacked civilian people in the district, looting properties. But he declined to give further details about the casualties.

(Control of Banaadir, the region where Mogadishu is located,
as of March 13, 2010; map prepared by Kermanshahi.)

Armed men in government uniforms seem to be a significant problem in Mogadishu. We consider Armed men force 300 families to flee from IDPs camp in Mogadishu , Sepember 5, 2011:

MOGADISHU (Sh. M. Network) – Armed men dressed in Somali government military uniforms have forcedsome 300 famine displaced people to flee from IDPs [Internally Displaced Person - EL] camps in Mogadishu’s Hodan district.

Witnesses said the internationally displaced people at Tarbunka area in Mogadishu were bullied and intimidated by armed men.

The witnesses said the armed assailants also destroyed and tore down IDPs makeshift settlements and huts.

Mohamed Ali, one of the people forced to flee, told Shabelle that there are no any casualties during the incident.

Ali asked Somali government to save them from the armed men who accustomed to bother the IDPs.

The TFG is working with African Union countries to bring more peacekeepers into the country, especially to stabilize the capital. From Somalia says more peacekeepers will be deployed to Mogadishu, September 5, 2011:

MOGADISHU (Sh. M. Network) – The Somali government has said additional peacekeeping forces form some of African countries will be deployed to the horn of African nations.

Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Defense Minister Hussein Arab Isse reported that 3,000 additional peacekeepers will be deployed to Mogadishu in October, composed of troops from Djibouti and Sierra Leone.

The African Union (AU) held a technical workshop on the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) to identify the next steps in Somalia.

Late last month, a military spokesman Major Ken Jabbie said Sierra Leone will send a battalion of 850 soldiers to boost an African Union mission in war-torn Somalia after April next year.

Jabbie said a five-man reconaissance mission was already in Mogadishu where the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is supporting government troops who have recently fought bloody battles with the Al Qaeda-inspired Shebab rebels who want to topple the administration.

On August 9 the AU made an urgent call for 3,000 more troops to secure the war-battered capital after Shebab rebels, who had controlled around half of the city, pulled out of the city claiming a change in military tactics.

The 9,000-strong mission is currently made up of troops from Uganda and Burundi.

Driving out the Al Shabaab militants is important, as they are widely perceived to be the reason why a drought has resulted in a famine that is killing thousands and threatening hundreds of thousands in Somalia. From Could Somali famine deal a fatal blow to al-Shabab? by Farouk Chothia, August 9, 2011:

Somalia's militant Islamist group al-Shabab is in crisis, as it battles to cope with the famine that is far worse in areas under its control than other parts of the country, leading to reports of splits in the leadership of the al-Qaeda-linked group.

The famine has forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee the Lower Shabelle and Bakool regions in search of food.

Many are escaping to the capital, Mogadishu, where over the weekend the group made what it called a tactical withdrawal of its forces from the northern suburbs that were under its control.

Others are walking for days to reach camps in neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia, arch-foes of al-Shabab.

"It is not a good picture for al-Shabab," says US-based Somali journalist Abdirahman Aynte, who is writing a book on the movement.

"Nearly 500,000 people have left. Al-Shabab cannot do anything about it. They have become bystanders."

He says al-Shabab - formed as the youth wing of the now-defunct Union of Islamic Courts in 2006 - had genuine support when it took power in most of south and central Somalia, as people longed for an end to the lawlessness that has gripped the country since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991.

"Even though al-Shabab had draconian laws, they were somewhat popular because of the stability they provided," says Mr Aynte.

"Government areas were not safe - even soldiers were involved in robbing and looting. In al-Shabab areas, you will have your hands amputated if you steal. It was a deterrent."

Kenya-based Somali journalist Fatuma Noor, who travelled through al-Shabab territory last year, says the famine has damaged the group's credibility.

"Al-Shabab are losing support. People are saying that the drought in the region was caused by a lack of rains, but the famine was man-made. They are asking - why has it been only in al-Shabab's areas?" Ms Noor says.

The connection between Al Shabaab and the famine is in part due to Al Shabaab's practice of extorting money from agencies that want to help. Skipping down:

"Al-Shabab has a humanitarian co-ordination office, which charges a registration fee of $4,000 to $10,000 (£2,400 to £6,000). They also charge a project fee - 20% of the overall cost of digging a borehole or setting up a feeding centre," Mr Aynte says.

The al-Shabab observer who preferred anonymity says the group's leadership is heavily divided over the food crisis - something the UN could have exploited to gain access to starving people.

Al-Shabab's southern leaders - especially Muktar Ali Robow, who comes from famine-hit Lower Shabelle, and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, who is seen as the elder statesman of Somali Islamists - favour accepting Western aid.

However, they were overruled by the overall leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, who has led al-Shabab into forging close ties with al-Qaeda.

"Robow's people are directly affected by this famine. So he wants aid agencies to come in. But Godane is suspicious of the UN and doesn't want them in Somalia. So he blocked it," the observer says.

"Robow is now accusing Godane [who hails from the breakaway region of Somaliland] of letting people starve."

The accusations of some factions allowing people loyal to other factions to starve is helping build rivalries.

Furthermore, like any street gang in an American city, control of turf means the ability to extort money from lucrative activities going on in that turf - and Al Shabaab has recently suffered military setbacks, resulting in a loss of control of parts of Mogadishu, which Al Shabaab's leaders have spun as a maneuver rather than a battlefield loss.

Additionally, Al Shabaab's use of the charcoal industry - which cuts trees to make charcoal which is exported to the Arabian Peninsula - as a source of income may have intensified the drought, as some environmental experts claim that cutting trees contributes to reduced rainfall. Regardless, Al Shabaab's extortion of local business activities means that Al Shabaab is no longer dependent on foreign funding, though extortion of aid operations would be a nice bonus.

The fact that Al Shabaab is losing credibility may be causing people to cooperate with government and African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) forces against Al Shabaab. From an AMISOM press release entitled AMISOM finds bomb-making factory in Mogadishu, from August 15, 2011:

A large bomb-making factory has been discovered by African Union troops in northern Mogadishu. AMISOM troops yesterday uncovered a cache of bomb-making components including improvised detonators, switches for suicide vests and a considerable amount of explosives.

The find came after a two-day operation to dislodge a number of extremists who were still occupying a former steel factory located north of Wardhigley District. There was clear evidence that the site was being used as a centre for the manufacture of suicide bombs and improvised explosive devices with which extremists have targeted innocent civilians, as well as government and AMISOM troops.

[snip]

Lt Col Paddy Ankunda, the AMISOM Force spokesperson said,

"We owe this success to the help and support from the people of Somalia, with whom we continue to rely on for information and tip-offs. This is a serious setback to the extremists who wish to harm the civilian populace."

This is in addition to the report of Al Shabaab weapons discovered in Bakara Market from two days previously:

Somali Police and African Union troops uncovered a large store of artillery shells in a disused house yesterday in Bakara Market from where the extremist militant group has recently withdrawn. It is believed these munitions were being stockpiled for use in making improvised bombs.

After a tip-off from residents in the city the Somali police went to the shell-damaged house in the centre of Bakara Market. When African Union troops, AMISOM, were called in they discovered 137 artillery shells of 155mm calibre. The extremist group, who until recently had been fighting soldiers of the African Union and Somali government, are not known to have the artillery weapons to fire these shells.

Of course, what I find interesting is how, under Islam, a fellow Muslim is supposed to be a fellow Muslim; only infidels are categorized (Russians, English, Croats, Serbs...). Yet, the reality is that Al Shabaab uses clan affiliation as a means of dividing up Somalis, and setting them against the government - even as Al Shabaab leadership apparently allows some Al Shabaab-affiliated clans to starve while permitting others to get food.

More to follow.

Unity and Faith, Part 4

In Part 1 we had an overview of Nigeria and introduced the various angles of the north/south split in the country. Then in Part 2 we considered some of the various factors in the unrest in Nigeria. Next, in Part 3 we examined the jihad and counterjihad aspects of this unrest a little more closely, encountering reason to suspect Nigeria's security forces of committing excesses, including extrajudicial killings, in dealing with the trouble.

We now review excerpts from 'Nigeria's Taliban': How Big a Threat?, dated July 30, 2009. With the ongoing violence in Nigeria today, it is important to keep in mind this article is from two years ago.

The immediate crisis may be over in Nigeria, but the threat of violence remains. Government security forces today attacked a mosque filled with Islamist militants, killing scores of fighters and forcing more to flee. The militants, blamed for days of violence across the country's north, belong to a group known as Boko Haram, which aims to overthrow the federal government in Abuja and impose a strict version of Islamic law. The sect's leader Mohammed Yusuf escaped the raid along with some 300 of his men, but was later arrested and then died in custody according to police. Four days of clashes, sparked by attacks on police stations and government buildings, have killed at least 300 people.

The Boko Haram leader died in police custody; interesting in light of the allegations against Nigeria's security forces that we considered in Part 3.

Continuing:

Also known as Nigeria's Taliban, Boko Haram formed about eight years ago. A huge government operation against the group in 2004 ended with the police claiming victory. But five years on and the militants are back, stronger and more vicious. In the latest outbreak of violence, in Maiduguri, the capital of northeastern Borno state, militant gunmen assaulted police stations and engaged armored-personnel backed troops.

Africa's most populous country sits on a religious fault line. Its 150 million people are split almost evenly between Muslims in the north and Christians in the south. For many years, the northern Muslim élite have dominated Nigerian politics, using their positions to enrich themselves and their families.

The allegations are that it was a "northern Muslim élite" responsible for much of the corruption.

Skipping down a little:

Over the past few years a new breed of young Muslim activists, most of them educated and from the middle class, have aggressively embraced a stricter version of Islam, rejecting anything Western and Christian.

It seems this sect may have been founded by younger Muslims who were angry at corruption among their parents. Regardless, as if often the case, the terrorist organization has its foundation among educated, middle class Muslims.

The article concludes pointing out the concern that al Qaeda might gain a foothold here, and calling attention to a special place Osama bin Laden had assigned Nigeria in the world's jihad.

A month later, Nigeria's Vanguard reported that Boko Haram ressurects, declares total Jihad:

The Islamic sect Boko Haram has declared total Jihad in Nigeria, threatening to Islamise the entire nation by force of war.

[snip]

WE SPEAK AS BOKO HARAM
For the first time since the Killing of Mallam Mohammed Yusuf, our leader, we hereby make the following statements.

1) First of all that Boko Haram does not in any way mean "Western Education is A sin" as the infidel media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually means "Western Civilisation" is forbidden. The difference is that while the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West, that is Europe, which is not true, the second affirms our believe in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not Education), for culture is broader, it includes education but not determined by Western Education.

[snip]

2) That the Boko Haram is an Islamic Revolution which impact is not limited to Northern Nigeria, in fact, we are spread across all the 36 states in Nigeria, and Boko Haram is just a version of the Al Qaeda which we align with and respect. We support Osama bin Laden, we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is totally Islamised which is according to the wish of Allah.

[snip]

Having made the following statement we hereby reinstate our demands:

1) That we have started a Jihad in Nigeria which no force on earth can stop. The aim is to Islamise Nigeria and ensure the rule of the majority Muslims in the country. We will teach Nigeria a lesson, a very bitter one.

[snip]

3) That we shall make the country ungovernable, kill and eliminate irresponsible political leaders of all leanings, hunt and gun down those who oppose the rule of Sharia in Nigeria and ensure that the infidel does not go unpunished.

It is not uncommon that analysts point to economic disparities as a source of the violence in Nigeria. But, the terrorists themselves point to Islamic ideology. Furthermore, at least some of the economic disparity is the fault of a corrupt "northern Muslim élite". Consequently, any analysis that does not factor in jihadist Islamic ideology is inadequate.

Fast forward to June 15, 2011, when an article in the Nigeria Daily News entitled Nigerian Islamist sect, Boko Haram vows fiercer, wider attacks quoted Boko Haram as declaring:

"Very soon, we will wage jihad...We want to make it known that our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where they received real training on warfare from our brethren who made that country ungovernable...," said the group in a handwritten statement.

"This time round, our attacks will be fiercer and wider than they have been," it said, adding it would target all northern states and the country's capital Abuja. The statement in Hausa, a widely spoken language in the North, was anonymously delivered to journalists in the North-eastern city of Maiduguri, capital of Borno State, where the attacks were concentrated.

The sect admitted links with a foreign Islamist group connected to Al-Qaeda, although security experts had already speculated that it had established ties with Islamists in North Africa.

Maiduguri featured in an attack only days later.

From Nigerian Boko Haram Islamists 'kill nurse' in Maiduguri, June 20, 2011:

Gunmen from Nigeria's radical Islamist sect Boko Haram have killed a nurse who was playing cards in the north-eastern city of Maiduguri, according to police.

Police said four people were also wounded in the shooting at a bus stop in the city.

Of interest is the connection to foreign terrorist groups; this is an international Islamic extremist ideology that is manifesting itself locally in Nigeria. Boko Haram's statement specifically mentioned Somalia, and there are reasons to suspect other connections.

First, we look at excerpts from Boko Haram Declares War, dated June 27, 2011:

Few seem convinced by President Goodluck Jonathan's assurances that the security situation is under control following the bombing on 16 June of Louis Edet House, the national police headquarters in Abuja. It killed at least two people and wounded seven. Agents of the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation arrived to help investigate claims of international terrorist links.

[snip]

Some immediate questions emerge from the latest round of attacks: Who is behind Boko Haram? How much foreign support has it got and how can it best be confronted? After downplaying its importance and regional ties for some years, Nigerian security officials now point to cross-border links.

[snip]

It seems their tactics are working: security sources speak of training camps of Hausa-speaking Nigerians in Burkina Faso and Niger as well as a wave of new recruits to Boko Haram across northern Nigeria. It's harder to trace the international links, but some officials are taking seriously claims from Boko Haram that their militants, including bomb-makers, have been training in Somalia alongside Al Shabaab and Al Qaida operatives. There are also small, highly mobile affiliates of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb across the Sahel, which could provide the training and the materiel to launch the type of bombings and guerrilla attacks that Boko Haram favours.

Also, in Part 2 we began reviewing a paper entitled Key Issues in Nigeria's 2011 Elections, dated March 29, 2011, by Sola Tayo. We now pick up with an excerpt from page 7:

Concerns about internal security are common during electoral periods, but the possible action of outsiders is also causing concern within the government. In November 2010 a shipment of arms was intercepted in Lagos. The intended destination of the shipment was unclear, although it is claimed it was to be re-exported to The Gambia. However the trafficked rockets and explosives, which came from Iran, were the responsibility of a Nigerian and two Iranians who have been charged with the importation of prohibited firearms. The incident caused a diplomatic storm which resulted in Nigeria reporting Iran to the UN Security Council for a possible arms violation. Although Nigeria has not severed diplomatic ties with Iran, the relationship (on the Nigerian side at least) is tense.

Whatever the intended destination of that shipment, the Nigerian government is understandably wary of arms shipments entering the country and ending up in the possession of militant groups. It is equally suspicious of direct interference by outsiders. In March 2010 the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, suggested that Nigeria be split in two to end the violence between Muslims and Christians. His comments provoked a strong reaction from the Nigerian government, with Abuja recalling the Ambassador in Tripoli and accusing Libya of trying to destabilize the country. The issue of partitioning the country into a Muslim north and Christian south is a deeply sensitive subject in Nigeria.

Gaddafi is not the only one to suggest this division of Nigeria; there are calls among Nigerians for a north/south (= Muslim/infidel) "divorce" and I am sure recent events in Sudan will fuel these calls. Also, the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, where a "northerner" of questionable Ivoirian credentials was installed by force by the international community, in violation of Ivoirian law, may set a precedent that worries the southerners in Nigeria.

The arms shipment addressed in the quoted passage above was quite substantial, too.

In fact, it was so substantial that some analysts suggested it was a new way to supply anti-Israeli terrorists forces. From Nigerian arms seizure may indicate new Iran-Hamas route, October 29, 2010.

Weapons discovered in 13 shipping containers in the Port of Lagos earlier this week could signify that Iran is trying to develop a new route to smuggle arms and explosives to Hamas in the Gaza Strip, defense officials said on Thursday.

The ship, apparently from Iran, reportedly docked in the Lagos Port on Tuesday and, according to the bill of lading, was supposed to be carrying construction supplies. On inspecting the 13 containers, customs officials discovered rockets, mortars, bombs, rifles and heavy machine guns hidden among crates of building tiles.

Nigerian officials were quoted in the media claiming that the cargo had been under surveillance for some time. It was possible that the intelligence on the cargo was supplied by Western sources.

"On opening the first container, the service operatives discovered rocket launchers, grenades and other explosives; the weapons were concealed among crates of floor tiles," Nigerian State Security Service spokeswoman Marilyn Ogar was quoted as saying.

The largest rocket appeared to be a 107-mm. Katyusha, which Iran is known to manufacture and which makes up the backbone of Hizbullah's and Hamas's arsenals.

Even if most of the weapons, including the rockets, are intended for Palestinian terrorists, it is not unreasonable to expect that local Nigerian jihadists might take a cut for helping move them.

So, we have Iranian arms smuggled into Nigeria, resulting in an international incident reported to the UN.

But, the report previously quoted above, Key Issues in Nigeria's 2011 Elections, only mentions the smuggled arms; why don't we hear about the heroin?

From From Iran: Customs intercept container of heroin at Tin-Can port, November 19, 2010 (I fixed misspellings of "heroin"):

LAGOS—Nigerian Customs Service has intercepted a large quantity of heroin concealed in a 40-foot container, which was believed to have originated from Iran. The container which was brought into the Tin-can Island Port [Nigeria's Tin Can Port - EL] was concealed among machine parts.

[snip]

Also confirming the interception of the large quantity of hard drugs at the Tin-Can Island Port, Customs spokesman, Mr. Wale Adeniyi, said that about ten wraps of heroin each weighing 112kg had been off-loaded from the container.

It was also gathered that CMA-CGM, the shipping company that brought in the 13 containers of arms and ammunition intercepted recently at the Apapa Port, also brought the heroin-laden container.

The heroin and the arms were being moved via the same smuggling route, it appears.

Nigeria is a major oil-producing country. We now see arms- and heroin smuggling from Iran, and connections to international Islamic terrorist groups. Where have we seen this combination before: oil, heroin, and Islamic terrorists?

A November, 2009, NATO research paper entitled An assessment of crime related risks in the Sahel touches on the role played by Nigerian organized crime cartels, and points to increasing movement of marijuana and cocaine across the Sahel region. Of course, I have been pointing to the movement of arms, terrorism and heroin through this region, and alluding to (though not yet establishing) connections between events in Côte d'Ivoire and cocaine trafficking from South America to Europe.

Boko Haram is connected to international Islamic terrorists who, in turn, are connected to international arms- and narcotics traffickers. These connections run to Iran, to Somalia, and across the Sahara/Sahel region to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. They of course run through nearby countries; Burkina Faso was specifically mentioned. Burkina Faso is a significant player in the world of transnational smuggling, and is implicated in the situation in Côte d'Ivoire; in fact, Côte d'Ivoire's new strongman, Ouattara, is from Burkina Faso. Nigerian groups are also connected to movement of South American cocaine.

Boko Haram's ideology is shared with terrorists all over the world; the "Religion of Peace" is in fact an ideology of terrorism. But, it would be cut off at the knees without all the transnational organized crime activities that fund it, via smuggling of cocaine, heroin, arms and other commodities, and that supply it with potent weapons.

Unfortunately, though, our "War on Terror", or whatever they call it these days, will only deal the most superficial aspects of terrorism. Political correctness will not allow us to connect terrorism to Islam, and corruption and illicit money which finds its way to important officials in Washington from transnational organized crime will not allow us to effectively address terrorism in any case.

Seat of the Shah, Part 6

In Part 1 we introduced the situation in Somalia; toward the end of the post I commented:

We hear about Somali piracy and Somalia as a base for terrorists, but we don't often hear the other side of the story: foreign fishing vessels fishing Somali waters and depleting fish stocks, foreign vessels dumping hazardous waste in Somali waters... Somalis have a right to be angry over these infringements on Somali sovereignty, and just because Somalia does not have an effective government to deal with this does not give foreigners the right to essentially rape Somalia like this.

In Part 2 we examined more of the chaotic situation there, and considered efforts by Somali government officials to restore order in their country. Then, in Part 3 we saw the mechanics of piracy - how the money gets distributed - and considered how the pirates held sway in one Somali town.

Part 4 addressed more on the mechanics of piracy, and touched on how the al-Shabaab terrorists were beginning their own television station, while Part 5 explored how environmental factors helped create conditions favorable to piracy, and how pirates actually help local communities by bringing much needed cash into the economy; and, we again touched on one motivating factor - the desire for revenge against foreign exploitation of Somali waters in the absence of an effective Somali governmental response.

In this post, we will update and explore a variety of themes. We begin with South Korean court jails four Somali pirates, dated May 27, 2011:

A Somali pirate has been jailed for life by a South Korean court, after being convicted of the attempted murder of the captain of a hijacked ship.

Mahomed Araye was one of several Somalis seized in January when South Korean special forces stormed a cargo ship hijacked in the Arabian Sea.

Another man was sentenced to 15 years; two others received 13-year terms.

The trial marks the first attempt by South Korea - a major seafaring nation - to punish foreign pirates.

The court in the port city of Busan ruled that only Araye had been involved in the shooting of Capt Seok Hae-Kyun, who is still recovering in hospital.

For additional background regarding the legal questions involved in trying pirates, may I suggest Q&A: What do you do with a captured pirate?

Meanwhile, the story quoted above is interesting, with an interesting tidbit of information found farther down:

In the course of the trial, prosecutors also said that a British man working in the insurance industry contacted the Samho shipping company shortly after the kidnapping, allegedly to broker a possible deal with the hijackers.

Some Brits looking to broker a deal...

Another recent article addresses how some people were arrested at the airport in Mogadishu trying to pay a ransom. Excerpts are from Brits arrested in Somalia with '£2.2 million ransom for pirates':

LONDON (Sh. M. Network) – The Britons, who are among a group of six foreigners also understood to include two Kenyans and an American - were allegedly caught with $3.6 million in cash at the airport in Somalia's capital Mogadishu.

[snip]

'It will be a risk consultancy-type operation and typically the guys doing it would be very experienced, military guys that have a clear understanding of the tasks they are going to be undertaking,' he said. 'The arrests were probably down to an information leak that caught them out, not the way they were doing it or where they were going because it's a regular thing.'

Andrew Mwangura, Maritime Editor for the Somali Report and founder of the Seafarers' Assistance Programme, which monitors piracy off the coast of East Africa, said: 'Ransom-handling is a very lucrative business – the majority of handlers are professionals working with private security companies.

'But this is the first time that anyone has been arrested whilst transferring the money.'

"Ransom-handling is a very lucrative business."

Skipping down:

Somalia's Transitional Federal Government, which controls only part of the war-torn country's territory, is opposed to the payment of ransoms, saying that it fuels piracy.

But according to a report released by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in May 2011, ransoms totalling $112.79m were paid to Somali pirates in 2010, up from $75.68m the previous year. Pay-offs are sometimes dropped onto vessels from aircraft, or passed through middlemen.

I wonder if the payment of ransoms doesn't fuel piracy for a variety of reasons.

Obviously, it's a get-rich-quick scheme for pirates in a country where honest work can only earn grinding poverty.

But, pirates aren't the only ones to profit off the endeavor.

Handling the ransoms is also a get-rich-quick scheme, isn't it?

Pirates take a vessel, middlemen negotiate, a ransom is paid and delivered, and everyone makes money, except for those who pay the ransom - often an insurance company.

Would that constitute both motive and opportunity for some of the ransom handlers and security people to work with the pirates?

We consider a report of a successful ransom payment and vessel release; Somali pirates say release Syria ship after ransom (again, recent but undated):

MOGADISHU (Sh. M. Network) – Somali pirates say they have freed a Syrian owned and Togo-flagged ship seized this year after they received a $2.5 million.

The 24,022 deadweight tonne MV Khaled Muhieddine K crewed by 22 Syrians and three Egyptians was taken by pirates in January in the North Arabian Sea, approximately 330 nautical miles southeast of the Omani port of Salalah.

Somali pirates said late on Wednesday they had received the ransom drop on Wednesday morning.

'The ransom has been dropped early in the morning and it was $2.5.million. We have abandoned the ship and it has just started to sail away from our shores safely,' a pirate who gave his name as Omar told Reuters from the pirates hideout of El-Dhanane.

Andrew Mwangura, a Kenya-based former maritime official and now the maritime editor of The Somalia Report said he was aware negotiations for the release of the ship were at an advanced stage, but was trying to confirm news of the ship's release.

Somali pirates are making tens of millions of dollars in ransoms from seizing ships, including tankers and dry bulkers, in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, despite the efforts of foreign navies to clamp down on such attacks.

Andrew Mwangura has a particular understanding of the situation involving the pirates. We now consider excerpts from an article he wrote, Somalia: Pirates or protectors?, dated May 20, 2010 (the date is listed as 2010, but the article was posted on May 23, 2011, and some of the references are to information current as of late 2010; other sites have the article with the 2010 date - ?):

The devastating Somali civil war since 1991 forced the Somali marine and fisheries sector to an abrupt collapse and almost all Somali fisheries activities shut down. The vessels of the Somali national fishing fleet were abducted and have never been returned. It is estimated that at least 200,000 people lost their jobs and the Somali fishing communities are still struggling to recover.

However, illegal fishing by foreign fleets and the more serious nuclear and toxic waste dumping from the industrialised world pose since then an environmental, socio-economic and ecological threat, which is unparalleled.

Very sophisticated factory-style fishing-vessels, which were designed for distant-water fishing and travel from faraway countries, whose harbours are thousands of miles away from Somalia and whose own fisheries resources are either under tight legal protection or already drastically overexploited, poured into the unprotected Somali waters.

They are in search of high-priced tuna, mackerel, swordfish, grouper, emperor, snapper, shark and of course the other valuable species in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. With impunity they rob rock-lobster and shrimps for the tables of the wealthiest in this world, and dolphins, sea turtles and sea-cucumbers for the deranged tastes of the Far East. They have diminished the extraordinary population of dugong to near extinction.

Their task is solely oriented toward short-term gains, knowing the ecological limits, since Somalia does not only experience political but also resource displacement. Besides civil strife and outright war, the massive foreign fishing piracy, bringing criminal poaching and wanton destruction of the Somali marine resources for the last 19 years, may be one of the most damaging factors for the country, economically, environmentally and security-wise.

The article provides a wealth of background information. Skipping down:

Mr [Mohammed] Waldo [a Somali specialist working with ECOTERRA International], who keeps a close watch of his country, traces the origin of sea piracy and pirate fishing in Somalia back to 1991 when the Siad Barre regime fell, resulting into the disintegration of the Somali navy and coastguard services.

'Following severe draughts in 1973/74 and 1986, tens of thousands of nomads, whose livestock were wiped out by the draughts, were re-settled along the villages on the long, 3,300 km Somali coast,' says the analyst. The resettled groups were developed into large fishing communities whose livelihoods depended mainly on inshore fishing, as well as the processing of the offshore catch.

From the early beginnings of the civil war in Somalia (as early as 1988) illegal fishing trawlers started to trespass and fish in Somali waters, including in the 12-nautical mile inshore artisanal fishing waters. The poaching vessels encroached on the local fishermen's grounds, competing for the abundant rock-lobster and high value pelagic fish in the warm, up-swelling 60km deep shelf along the tip of the Horn of Africa.

ECOTERRA International and Waldo describe the deadly events that were to follow in the war torn country thus: 'The piracy war between local fishermen and the IUU [illegal, unreported and unregulated - fishing] ventures started here. Local fishermen documented cases of trawlers pouring boiling water on the fishermen in canoes, their nets cut or destroyed, smaller boats crushed, killing all the occupants, and other abuses suffered as they tried to protect their national fishing turf.' ECOTERRA International has many well documented cases that fishing nets provided by the emergency funds from the international community to ease the disaster of 1992/3 were wiped from the coast by foreign trawlers just days after they were provided to the impoverished fishing communities of Somalia.

Later, the fishermen armed themselves. In response, many of the foreign fishing vessels armed themselves too and with more sophisticated weapons and began to overpower the Somali fishermen again. It was only a matter of time before the local fishermen reviewed their tactics and modernised their hardware. This escalation and cycle of warfare has been going on from 1991 to the present. It is now developing into fully a fledged, two-pronged illegal fishing and sea piracy conflicts, which in addition soon will become politicised and radicalised if nothing stops the foreign impact.

The local fishing net incidents from 1992/3 - that was when US forces were in Somalia trying to stabilize the country and help the economy get back on track so the people wouldn't starve. Meanwhile, international fishing vessels were destroying the emergency nets, causing further harm to the local economy and further instability, contributing to the dangerous situation our troops and the troops of our allies faced.

The direction this could go in now is that the pirates could ally themselves with the al-Shabaab jihadists - both groups are enemies of the international community, and preying on infidel business could be justified using some interpretations of Islamic texts. Somalia could develop into not just a regional but a serious global menace - menacing more than just critical international shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean.

Or, efforts could be made to deal with some of the underlying problems, which include the other pirates, those who dump toxic waste and fish Somali waters illegally.

Two hundred years ago, when our young nation was dealing with Islamic pirates off the coast of North Africa, it was cannonballs, not gold, that stopped the piracy. Near those same parts of Africa today, Islamic militants operate in a sea of sand - the Sahara/Sahel region - and fund their insurgency through kidnappings and ransoms; they are now turning to narcotics, arms and human trafficking. The payment of ransoms to Somali pirates needs to stop - it is merely fueling the crisis, and could easily contribute to a pirate/terrorist coalition which, in turn, could evolve in the direction of moving drugs, guns and other contraband. And the middlemen need to be investigated, because some of the biggest money to be made in piracy is to set oneself up as a middleman/negotiator/ransom handler.

Consequently, efforts to fight the pirates and police Somali waters need priority from the international community, but must be in conjunction with established and legitimate Somali authorities, and must include efforts to keep foreigners from exploiting Somalia's territorial waters.

This needs to happen before the situation deteriorates, fueled by Islamic extremism and easy ransom money, and perhaps spreads into neighboring countries.

Heavy battle rocks parts of Mogadishu:

MOGADISHU (Sh. M. Network) – Heavy battle between Somali army supported militarily African Union peacekeepers and Al shabaab on Thursday night broke out in northern part of Mogadishu, according to local residents.

The fighting erupted after Al shabaab, which US alleges to be al Qaeda’s proxy in the horn of Africa nation, have launched the northern districts of Bondhere and Abdul-aziz.

Sporadic firefight leaves two dead in Mogadishu:

MOGADISHU (Sh. M. Network) – Sporadic firefight and artillery barrages erupted between Somali government forces backed by African Union peacekeepers and Al shabaab in Somalia’s war torn capital of Mogadishu, witnesses said of Friday.

The fighting started after Somali forces and AMISOM troops attacked key Al shabaab military bases in Hodan district in southern Mogadishu.

In the duration of the battle, the two warring factions used both heavy and light weapons as the echoes of artillery barrages could be heard most of the capital neighborhoods.

Al Shabaab fighters in Gedo region called for ceasing fire:

MOGADISHU (Sh. M. Network) – The administration of Somali government in Gedo region in Southern Somalia on Friday called for the fighters of Al shabaab in the region to cease fire.

Speaking to Shabelle Media Network, Mohammed Abdi Kalil, the governor of Gedo region said that Al shabaab fighters to stop violence and take peace.

Somalia: People start displacing from Gedo as battle looms:

BURDHUBO (Sh. M. Network) – As tense between Somali government forces and Al shabaab fighters is escalating, a lot of local residents in Gedo region started fleeing from their homes.

Ugandan Police Says Somali Extremists Sneak into Country:

KAMPALA (Sh. M. Network) –Ugandan police on Thursday confirmed that 'suicide bombers' trained by Somali extremists had sneaked into the country with the intention of carrying out bomb attacks similar to the July 2010 blasts that killed dozens of people.

Seat of the Shah, Part 5

Previous parts of this series are Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, and Part 4. Especially in Part 3 and Part 4 we began looking hard at piracy from Somalia.

We now consider an April 15, 2011, article entitled Somali pirates get ransom, free ship but keep Indian hostages:

MOGADISHU, Somalia — In a move that could change the pirate-hostage equation, Somali pirates on Friday took in a multimillion-dollar ransom, then released the ship and some of the crew but kept all the Indian crew members as hostages.

[snip]

"We decided to keep the Indian because India is holding our colleagues," the pirate, Hassan Farah, said. "We released the other crew members who sailed away from our coast. We will keep these Indians until the Indians release our colleagues."

Farah said the pirates in the stronghold of Haradhere have taken that collective decision. The Indian hostages are to be moved to land.

[snip]

Friday's pirate action marks a major departure from the standard pirate business model of release-for-ransom and could complicate international military efforts against the piracy trade.

Earlier this year pirates killed four American hostages while U.S. Navy warships were shadowing the hijacked yacht, the first time pirates had done that.

Overall, analysts say pirates are becoming increasingly aggressive, violent and hostile.

The problem of pirates based in Somalia is spreading, too.

From Pirate attacks hit an all-time high worldwide, April 14, 2011:

KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia — Piracy hit an all-time high worldwide in the first three months of 2011 led by a surge in incidents off the coast of Somalia, a maritime watchdog said Thursday.

The International Maritime Bureau said a record high of 142 attacks in the first quarter came as Somalian pirates become more violent and aggressive.

The International Maritime Bureau's piracy reporting center said 97 of the attacks occurred off the coast of Somalia, up sharply from 35 in the same period last year.

It said attackers seized 18 vessels worldwide, including three big tankers, in the January-March period and captured 344 crew members. Pirates also murdered seven crew members and injured 34 during the quarter.

The Kuala Lumpur-based center's director Pottengal Mukundan said Thursday that there was a "dramatic increase in the violence and techniques" used by Somali pirates to counter increased patrols by international navies.

A little background can be found in articles reprinted in the Somaliland Times. From For a Somali pirate, it's all about skill, contacts and luck, April 7, 2011 (reprinted at Somaliland Times):

HARGEISA, Somalia // Ahmed Mohammed Adan knows that every Somali pirate who sets out to sea is taking a big gamble.

An attempt to hijack one of the giant cargo ships or oil tankers passing through the Indian Ocean or Arabian Sea could end in capture, death - or hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Adan, six feet tall, broad-shouldered, and 23 years old, speaks with some authority on the subject, having been convicted of piracy in a local court more than a year ago. He is now in a prison in Hargeisa in northern Somalia.

Though he denies ever hijacking a ship, or even trying to, he is still able to detail the life of a pirate. Despite its great risks, piracy continues to lure thousands of young Somali men like him because of the prospect of great rewards.

"There's a lot of people who are actually interested," he said, sitting in a prison office in his crisp yellow uniform. "But you have to be well-connected."

Skipping down:

The booming piracy industry, which is centred in the Horn of Africa, has gone far beyond the ragtag days of three or four years ago. Sophistication has replaced improvisation, with successful pirates required to know how to fire a rocket-propelled grenade and an AK-47, as well as use a satellite telephone and read a GPS system, an official with the United Nations counter-piracy programme said.

Equally important, an accomplished pirate must also belong to the right clan, the critical circle of trust in Somali society.

These prerequisites are no guarantee of success, Adan said. Weapons break. Engines fail. Navies stand more prepared than ever to protect the sea lanes with force.

It was the last pitfall that ensnared Adan. Along with six others, he was arrested in Somaliland by the regional coast guard, tried by a local court and sentenced to 15 years in jail. The sentence was reduced to two years on appeal.

Despite the risks, however, for an impoverished young Somali whose prospects are dim, the lure of piracy can be irresistible.

According to Adan, a team of pirates typically includes a veteran leader and fresh recruits. A group of investors, usually about five, supply the team with a boat, fuel, ladders and weapons. A deal is struck, sometimes in writing. The investors usually get half the profits and the negotiator a quarter. The crew splits the rest.

A typical piracy operation in the Indian Ocean lasts two weeks and costs $3,000, Adan said. If the team fails to seize a ship in that time, they return to port, refuel and set sail again, he said. When they succeed in capturing a ship, they dock it, keep the kidnapped crew alive and wait for their negotiator to secure a ransom.

Commander Stein Olav Hagalid, a Nato representative, said pirates succeed about every one in four attacks. While ransom negotiations are more arduous now, lasting an average of about seven months, ransoms are rising, too. The average payment now tops $5 million, Commander Hagalid said.

So, after perhaps as few as four attempts, costing $3000 each, the pirates can expect success, worth millions. One quarter of the ransom gets split among the pirates, so a pirate could easily have $100,000 after just a few attempts at hijacking a ship. At that point, the pirate need not go to sea, but can become an investor:

Even with their relatively small split of the profits, that means that after just one, two or perhaps three successful missions, a pirate can become an investor, recruit others to carry out the dangerous work and relax, Adan said.

"Once they get some money, they don't want to take chances - they send another crew to go," he said.

With tens of millions of dollars in ransoms streaming in, Adan's hometown of Galkayo is thriving. More of its residents are opening small businesses, driving big cars and building homes.

So... the pirates help the local community develop job skills, then reinvest the profits back into the local community, generating a localized economic boom.

No wonder... from Unrepentant pirate shows how far world has to go to curb growing scourge, April 7, 2011 (also found at Somaliland Times):

HARGEISA, Somalia // Farah Ismail Idle has only one regret about being a pirate: getting caught.

Idle, who has three years left to serve in prison after being convicted of piracy, said he cannot wait to head back to sea, a desire he reiterates every chance he gets, whether to his cellmate or the prison guards.

"When I finish my sentence in prison, I will go back and resume my business," he says.

The resolve of Idle and other convicted pirates suggests that the international community will have to offer far more carrots - and wield a far larger stick - if it is to stem the growing problem of piracy. Pirates have seized 14 ships and 250 crew so far this year. All told, they now hold 28 vessels and 587 crew hostage, according to the International Maritime Bureau.

But, why, besides money, are they doing this? Skipping down:

Nevertheless, Idle, the unrepentant pirate, illustrates how far the international community has to go in order to curb the growing scourge.

Before he was caught by Somaliland's coast guard, convicted and jailed, Idle, 38, spent four years trolling the Indian Ocean for ships. He organised men, food, ladders, pistols, AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades, he said. He denies actually hijacking a ship.

But like many Somalis, Idle justifies piracy as an answer to foreign firms that he said overfished Somali waters and polluted them with toxic waste.

"I call them 'pirates' because they invaded my sea," he said.

By hijacking ships, Somalis seek revenge and international attention to their languishing fishing industry, he said.

"Our plan was twofold: first to hijack them, then ask for ransom. And the world would be alert - would know why we are doing this."

The collapse of a government in Somalia made Somalian waters a haven for predatory international business - deplete the fishstocks, dump toxic waste - and now some elements feel justified in retaliating against these international predators.

Concluding:

Now, Idle is keen to serve out his sentence and resume work in what he describes as a booming business.

"The people who are going to the field are getting more," he said. "In the beginning the ransom was around $500,000, but day-by-day it's increasing."

"I am not giving up," he said. "More pirates, more happiness."

Farther to the south, in the part of Somalia bordering Kenya, the economic situation is deteriorating due to environmental conditions. From Drought Hits Villagers And IDPs Fleeing Fighting, April 15, 2011:

Nairobi — A severe drought in and around Somalia's southern town of Dobley is taking its toll on thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs), some of whom have been displaced several times by fighting.

As a result, lack of water, food and shelter has worsened the condition of an already weak population, according to local sources.

The displaced include hundreds of families who fled the capital, Mogadishu, and had to flee again when Dobley recently became a battle-ground between the Islamist opposition Al-Shabab and a pro-government militia, the Raskambone Group.

[snip]

Mohmamed Muhumud Hassan, a traditional elder, told IRIN on 14 April that many of those displaced from Dobley did not even have utensils. "These are people who fled for their lives, taking with them very little. They are now stranded in villages ravaged by drought," Hassan said.

Food, water and shelter were a priority for both the displaced and the locals, he added.

"Almost all the cattle, sheep and goats have been lost due to the drought," he said. "They [the villagers] cannot help anyone; they need help."

How long until these people join terrorists, a militia, a group of pirates... or perhaps decide to hire out as mercenaries in some place like Libya?

Back on March 2, 2008, Dobley - the Somali town mentioned above - was the target of a US strike aimed at Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists who, in turn, are establishing outreach to local communities. From Somalia: "Oh My Gosh, Pirates!" dated April 29, 2008:

Islamist al-Shabaab militants in southern and central Somalia are combining their military operations with political outreach. Ultimately, the rise and consolidation of an Islamist movement pursuing a regional and international agenda will create a growing threat to the rest of the Horn of Africa.

And, as I mentioned in Part 4, the terrorists were "the first to have a local TV station in a place where only terrorists and pirates can afford a TV. :)"

Piracy, Islamic terrorism, environmental disasters... funny how these things interact.